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ASSOCIATIVE MEANING AND SCALAR IMPLICATURE:  
A LINGUISTIC-SEMIOTIC ACCOUNT [*] 
James Dickins (University of Leeds, j.dickins@leeds.ac.uk) 
 
 
Abstract. This paper shows that three kinds of phenomena typically subject to 
disparate analyses are all forms of ‘associative meaning’: (i) extralinguistic-
based, (ii) linguistic-based, and (iii) scalar implicature-based. It argues that scalar 
implicature in particular may be of three types: hyponymous, quasi-hyponymous, 
and pseudo-hyponymous. The paper begins with a basic definition of denotative 
and connotative meaning, and within connotative meaning of associative mean-
ing. A formal model is provided for utterance-meaning, based around the notions 
of referent and ascription. This allows for a detailed formal analysis of extralin-
guistic- and linguistic-based associative meaning. The model is refined to ad-
dress scalar implicature-based associative meaning, through a theory-based ac-
count of the distinction between ambiguity and indeterminacy, allowing for a 
formal analysis of ‘some’ and cardinal numbers. I also briefly consider a fourth 
type of associative meaning – contextually determined associative meaning – us-
ing Arabic examples, to illustrate the profound conventionality and language-
specificity of the relevant aspects of meaning. Rather than providing a new ac-
count of how we understand the meaning of scalar implicatures, or other aspects 
of utterance-meaning, this paper adopts the standpoint that in order to understand 
how a hearer understands what an utterance means, we need to know first what it 
means; i.e. a coherent model of utterance-meaning is a sine qua non for the in-
vestigation of utterance cognition.  
 
Key words: associative meaning; scalar implicature; semiotics; pragmatics; de-
notative meaning (denotation); connotative meaning (connotation); some; all; 
cardinal numbers 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper shows that three kinds of phenomena typically subject to disparate analyses are 
all forms of ‘associative meaning’: (i) extralinguistic-based (e.g. the meaning associations 
of ‘nurse’ in English with ‘female nurse’ rather than ‘male nurse’), (ii) linguistic-based 
(e.g. the differing meaning tendencies of the synonyms vernietigen and vernielen ‘to de-
stroy’ in nineteenth-century written Dutch, to be used to refer to different kinds of destruc-
tion); and (iii) scalar implicature-based (e.g. the tendency for ‘some’ to be interpreted as 
meaning ‘not all’). It also argues that scalar implicature in particular may be of three types: 
hyponymous, quasi-hyponymous, and pseudo-hyponymous. 
                                                 
[*] Previously unpublished. Peer-reviewed before publication. [Editor’s note] 
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Drawing on ideas developed within the semiotic and linguistic theory of axiomatic 
functionalism (e.g. Mulder 1989; Dickins 1998; and Dickins 2009, which includes formal 
definitions of the theoretical terms discussed here), this paper begins with a basic definition 
of denotative and connotative meaning (Section 2), and within connotative meaning of 
associative meaning (Section 2.1). It considers three types of associative meaning: extral-
inguistic-based, linguistic-based, and scalar implicature-based (Sections 3–3.3). A formal 
model is provided for utterance-meaning, based around the notions of referent and ascrip-
tion (Section 4). This allows for a detailed formal analysis of extralinguistic- and linguis-
tic-based associative meaning (Section 4.1). The model is refined to address scalar implica-
ture-based associative meaning (Section 5), through a theory-based account of the distinc-
tion between ambiguity and indeterminacy (Section 5.1), allowing for a formal analysis of 
‘some’ (Section 5.3.1) and cardinal numbers (Section 5.3.2). I briefly consider a fourth 
type of associative meaning – contextually determined associative meaning – using Arabic 
examples, to illustrate the profound conventionality and language-specificity of the rele-
vant aspects of meaning (Section 6). 
This paper does not attempt to provide a new account of how we understand the mean-
ing of scalar implicatures, or other aspects of utterance-meaning, or consider in detail ex-
isting ‘cognitive pragmatic’ accounts of this nature. Rather, it adopts the standpoint that in 
order to understand how a hearer understands what an utterance means, we need to know 
first what it means; i.e. a coherent model of utterance-meaning is a sine qua non for the 
investigation of utterance cognition. This point is argued at various places in the paper, 
particularly in the conclusion (Section 7). 
 
 
2. Denotative vs. connotative meaning 
 
This paper operates with a basic distinction between denotative meaning and connotative 
meaning. Denotative meaning can be understood for current purposes as involving the 
overall range of a word1  or multi-word unit or, by extension syntactic structure (including 
the words involved in that structure), in a particular sense: two words/multi-word 
units/syntactic structures in a particular sense which ‘pick out’ the same extensional range 
of entities in the world – or better, in all possible worlds, real and imaginable – have the 
same denotative meaning. The term ‘entity’ is used here in the broadest possible sense, to 
cover not only objects – physical and abstract – but also all sorts of other notions: e.g. 
qualities (as denoted by adjectives), processes (as denoted by verbs), relations (as denoted 
by prepositions), etc. (cf. also Mulder and Rastall 2005). This initial definition will be re-
fined later in this paper (Sections 5–5.3.2). Denotative meaning is also known by other 
terms, e.g. denotational meaning, denotation, propositional meaning and cognitive mean-
ing (e.g. Cruse 1986: 45, 271–277). Connotative meaning, or connotation, is defined here 
negatively as all kinds of meaning which are not denotative meaning.  
Connotative meaning, as noted, is all kinds of meaning which are not denotative mean-
ing, i.e. connotative meanings are those kinds of meanings which do not involve the exten-
                                                 
1 ‘Word’ is not, in fact, a technical term in extended axiomatic functionalism. I will, however, use the term 
‘word’ in this paper as a synonym for a certain, albeit ill-defined, kind of grammatical entity / signum (for 
these terms, see Section 4). 
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sional range of a word/multi-word unit/syntactic structure. Connotative meaning is thus 
meaning minus denotative meaning. There are many kinds of connotative meaning (perhaps 
an endless number). For various lists of a type which are relatively consonant with the cur-
rent approach, see Leech (1981), Hervey and Higgins (2002; also Dickins, Hervey and Hig-
gins 2002), and Baker (1992; following Lyons 1977). In this paper, I will deal with only one 
kind of connotative meaning: what Hervey and Higgins (2002) call ‘associative meaning’. 
 
 
2.1 Associative meaning 
 
Hervey and Higgins define associative meaning as “that part of the overall meaning of an 
expression which consists of expectations that are – rightly or wrongly – associated with 
the referent of the expression” (Hervey and Higgins 2002: 149–150). For reasons which 
will become apparent later in this paper (especially Section 4 onwards), we can rephrase 
this as “that part of the overall meaning of an expression which involves features typically 
ascribed to the referent of the expression”. The word ‘nurse’ is a good example. Most peo-
ple automatically associate ‘nurse’ with the idea of female gender, as if ‘nurse’ were syn-
onymous with ‘female who looks after the sick’ – on the basis that in the real world (at 
least in Britain and other English-speaking countries at the start of the twenty-first century) 
nurses are typically female. “This unconscious association is so widespread that the term 
‘male nurse’ has had to be coined to counteract its effect: ‘he is a nurse’ sounds semanti-
cally odd, even today” (Hervey and Higgins 2002: 150). 
It is important to stress here that the oddity of ‘he is a nurse’ is not a matter of semantic 
contradiction – as would be ‘he is an actress’ (where ‘he’ and ‘actress’ involve semantic 
disjunction) – but merely of unusualness. A Google search for the string “he’s a nurse” 
(29.5.2014) yielded 96,800 hits, while a search for “she’s a nurse” yielded 922,000 hits (an 
example of ‘he’s a nurse’ brought up by the Google search being “He's not a performer by 
profession, he's a nurse at Valley Hospital”). Associative meaning specifies a narrower 
typical ‘denotative range’ than that of the (full) denotative meaning of a word/multi-word 
unit/syntactic structure (in the relevant sense). The (full) denotative meaning of ‘nurse’ (in 
the relevant sense) thus encompasses both ‘male nurse’ and ‘female nurse’, the associative 
meaning ‘female nurse’ having a narrower ‘denotative range’ than the full denotative range 
of ‘nurse’. 
 
 
3. Three types of associative meaning 
 
In this paper I will consider in detail three types of associative meaning: extralinguistic-
based, of which ‘nurse’ is an example (Section 3.1), linguistic-based (Section 3.2) and sca-
lar implicature-based (Section 3.3). 
 
 
3.1 Extralinguistic-based associative meaning 
 
Extralinguistic associative meanings are those associative meanings which are determined 
– or perhaps better, motivated – by the facts of the extralinguistic world. An example is the 
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fact that ‘nurse’ has associations of femaleness (Section 2). In Britain (and the West gener-
ally), the great majority of nurses are female. Accordingly, the word ‘nurse’ tends to be 
associated with females. The great majority of engineers, by contrast, are males. Accord-
ingly, the word ‘engineer’ tends to be associated with males: it has the associative meaning 
‘male’. 
 
 
3.2 Linguistic-based associative meaning 
 
Linguistic associative meanings are those associative meanings which are linguistically 
determined, i.e. determined by the semantics of the language involved, rather than by fea-
tures of the extralinguistic real world. Linguistic associative meanings are illustrated with 
particular clarity by certain cases of what is sometimes known as ‘imperfect synonymy’, 
i.e. pairs of words which have the same range of meanings (extension), and thus the same 
denotation, but tend to mean different things from one another. A good example is pro-
vided by the two verbs vernietigen and vernielen ‘to destroy, bring to nought’ in nine-
teenth-century written Dutch (see Geeraerts 1988; discussed in Dickins 1998: 118). 
 
The two words appear to have referred to exactly the same range of situations and exhibited 
identical selection restrictions, even in the writings of one and the same author. Were these 
two words, then, “perfect synonyms”? Geeraerts argues they were not. Differences emerged 
when the frequencies of different senses were compared, vernietigen being used predomi-
nantly in an abstract sense, while vernielen referred predominantly to an act of physical de-
struction. Remarks in contemporary handbooks of good usage also pointed to a difference in 
the conceptual centres of the two words (Taylor 1989: 56). 
 
In 19th century written Dutch, vernietigen and vernielen, seem to have been denotatively 
identical (“The two words appear to have referred to exactly the same range of situations 
and exhibited identical selection restrictions”). They were, however, connotatively differ-
ent – more specifically, different in terms of their associative meanings (“Differences 
emerged when the frequencies of different senses were compared, vernietigen being used 
predominantly in an abstract sense, while vernielen referred predominantly to an act of 
physical destruction”; as discussed in Section 4, these are described in the present paper as 
sub-senses rather than senses (proper)). The fact that vernietigen was used predominantly 
to refer to abstract destruction, while vernielen referred predominantly to an act of physical 
destruction had nothing to, however, do with the nature of the real world in nineteenth cen-
tury Holland. Rather, it was a matter of the linguistic semantics of these two words (in the 
relevant sense). 
 
 
3.3 Scalar implicature-based associative meaning 
 
There is a third category of associative meaning which is neither extralinguistic (Section 
3.1) nor linguistic (Section 3.2), i.e. it relates neither to features of the real world, nor to 
linguistic semantic conventions. Rather it is typically analysed as involving what Grice 
(1989) terms conversational implicature. This can be illustrated by the following example, 
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which involves scalar implicature (Grice 1989). If I say, “The house is big”, I tend to mean 
that it is big, but not huge. This is despite the fact that in principle one can refer to a huge 
object by saying that it is ‘big’. Usages such as “This house is big” to mean ‘[…] not huge’ 
are frequently explained in terms of Grice’s maxim of quantity, which requires the speaker 
to be just as informative as is required. If the speaker had been in a position to make the 
stronger statement “the house is huge”, they would have done so. Since they did not, how-
ever, the hearer is expected to believe that the stronger statement is not true. ‘Big’ can be 
said to have the associative meaning of ‘[big but] not huge’ (for a refinement of this, see 
Section 5.2.1.1). 
In addition to the Gricean, there are numerous current alternative views about how we 
understand scalar implicature and related phenomena. Horn (1972 and 1989) provides a still 
popular account, based on pre-existing lexical scales (often referred to as Horn scales). Re-
cent works include Schlenker (forthcoming) and Sauerland (2012), both of whom consider 
various approaches, Geurts (2009), who argues that the Gricean account needs to be supple-
mented by ‘local pragmatics’, and Breheny (2008), who offers a relevance theory account of 
numerically quantified noun phrases. There is also a large experimentally-based psycholin-
guistic literature on scalar implicature; e.g. Katsos and Breheny (2010), Tavano (2010). For a 
recent approach which partially rejects ‘pragmatic’ accounts see Boguslawski (2010).  
It is not the purpose of this paper to consider the viability, or otherwise, of any of these 
approaches. The point here is simply to note that if the Gricean or another pragmatic ac-
count of such phenomena is true, scalar implicature-based associative meaning is rooted in 
universal human communicative behaviour. 
 
 
4. A formal model for associative meaning: signum ontology 
 
Dickins (1998: 117–125) provides a formal model for the semantic analysis of associative 
meaning in terms of the general linguistic (and semiotic) theory of extended axiomatic 
functionalism – and specifically one of the two components of the theory, the signum on-
tology. A brief explanation of the signum ontology is necessary for an understanding of 
subsequent analyses in this paper (a more detailed explanation of the rationale for the sig-
num ontology is provided in Dickins, in prep.). The signum ontology (plus the associated 
areas of general phonetics and general semantics) can be visualised as in Figure 1. 
In explaining Figure 1, I will start with general phonetics and general semantics. These 
are ancillary areas of enquiry to the signum ontology, but necessary for it, as will be made 
clear later in this section.  
General phonetics provides models for speech sounds. The most basic notion in relation 
to general phonetics is a pure sound event, i.e. a completely unanalysed ‘thing’. This is a 
maximally minimal model, one so minimal that all it does it to ‘register’ the existence of 
the entity in question without analysing that entity in any way. We may call this ‘thing’ an 
unascribed phonetic image-correlate (the reasons why it is ‘unascribed’ will be made clear 
below), and we may symbolise it as Į. There is, by definition, nothing which we can do 
merely using this unascribed phonetic image-correlate in terms of linguistic analysis, since 
all we have done is to characterise it as existing. 
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Figure 1 
Signum ontology (plus general phonetics and general semantics)2 
A phonetic image (symbolised as i) consists of an unascribed phonetic image-correlate 
(symbolised as Į, as discussed above) brought into a relationship (symbolised as R) with a 
set-forming criterion (symbolised as a); i.e. it is an unascribed phonetic-image correlate 
which is ascribed to a particular set of unascribed phonetic-image correlates (for discussion 
of this, see Dickins in prep.). Thus, phonetic image can be defined as i = ĮRa. Phonetic 
image (as a notion) can also be symbolised as >Į< (as an alternative to i). 
An example of a phonetic image is >ph<, i.e. a particular sound event characterised as 
belonging to a particular class (or set) of sound events all of whose members are conceived 
of belonging to a class ‘aspirated p’. A phonetic image >ph< can thus be more fully sym-
bolised as ĮiR{ph} (i.e. a particular phonetic image Įi, conceived as a token/member a 
htype/class/set of phonetic images, i.e. {p }, deemed all to be the same except for their 
                                                 
2 A few terminological points may be noted in relation to Figure 1. Extended axiomatic functionalism uses 
the suffix -ete consistently for all entities at the level of individual realisations (instantiations: Dickins 2009: 
Def. 22): i.e. the entities phonete, morphonete, semonete, and delete. The prefix allo- is similarly used con-
sistently for all entities at the levels of generalised realisations (manifestations: Dickins 2009: Def. 26o): i.e. 
the entities allomorph, allomorphon, alloseme, allosemon, allocene, and allodele. The term ‘phonete’ is thus 
preferred to the equivalent term in Mulder ‘allophonon’ (Mulder 1989: 166), or in Biþan ‘phonon’ (Biþan 
2008: 7). Other principles of consistency of terminology should be fairly evident from Figure 1. 
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time/space individuality). This relating to a particular type of what would otherwise merely 
be an unascribed phonetic image-correlate may be called its ascription: by ascribing the 
unascribed phonetic image-correlate to a particular type/class/set we are giving it a ma-
nipulable modelled identity. 
The class (set) to which individual phonetic images belong is a phonetic form. This can 
be
events and generalisations 
(cl
ionship (R) with a particular pho-
no
ship (R) with a particular 
ph
hich for present purposes can be taken to be the same 
as 
s models for ‘(meanable) entities’ (with ‘entity’ understood 
in 
 defined {i}, i.e. a class (set) of phonetic images (a phonetic image being i, as discussed 
above). Phonetic form is also symbolised in Figure 1 as f. Phonetic forms can be symbol-
ised using reverse square brackets, ] and [  – for example ]ph[ . 
Phonetic image and phonetic form are models for sound 
asses) of these sound events, regardless of the linguistic status of these sound events. We 
can, however, consider such sound events in relation to specific languages, and in particu-
lar in relation to the phonological entities of specific languages. When we do this, we are 
moving into the signum ontology (proper) of the theory. 
A phonete is a phonetic image (i) brought into a relat
logical entity – phoneme, etc. (d). That is to say, it is a model for a specific speech sound 
(uttered at a specific time and place) in relation to a particular language (i.e. realising a 
phonological entity – phoneme, etc. – in a particular language). Phonete is symbolised as 
iRd. Angle brackets can be used to signify phonetes, e.g. <ph>. 
An allophone is a phonetic form (f) brought into a relation
onological entity – phoneme, etc. (d). The English phoneme /p/ might be said to have the 
allophones [p] (unaspirated ‘p’), [ph] (aspirated ‘p’), and [p¬] (unreleased ‘p’). Unlike 
phonetes, allophones are not individual space-time bound entities. We can, in fact, also 
define an allophone as a set of all the phonetes which have ever been and could ever be 
uttered belonging to the relevant class (for the phoneme /p/ in English there are three rele-
vant classes [p], [ph] and [p¬], assuming we analyse English /p/ as having three allophones 
[p], [ph] and [p¬]). As a set of phonetes, we can thus symbolise an allophone as {iRd}. 
What is meant by ‘allophone’ in extended axiomatic functionalism is roughly the same as 
what is meant by allophone in traditional linguistics. An allophone can be represented as in 
traditional linguistics, and as above. 
A figura or phonological form (w
a phonological entity) can be defined as a set of allophones belonging to the same pho-
nological identity (the same d). Thus the English phoneme /p/ (as a phonological 
form/entity) can be defined as a set of allophones [p], [ph] and [p¬]. Phonological form 
(entity) can be symbolised as p, and defined p={fRd}. A phonological form in extended 
axiomatic functionalism is roughly the same as a phonological entity in traditional linguis-
tics, and can be represented (like phonological entities in traditional linguistics) by slant 
brackets (as with /p/ above).  
General semantics provide
the broadest possible way to include not only concrete and abstract ‘things’, but also 
processes, relations, etc., and not only actually existing entities, but also potential and im-
aginary entities, etc.). The most basic notion in relation to general semantics is a pure ‘en-
tity’, i.e. a completely unanalysed ‘thing’. We may call this ‘thing’ an unascribed semantic 
image-correlate or a referent, and we may symbolise it as ȕ. There is, by definition, noth-
ing which we can do merely using this unascribed semantic image-correlate or referent in 
terms of linguistic analysis, since all we have done is to characterise it as existing. (What I 
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have here termed above an unascribed phonetic-image correlate is termed an ‘(auditory) 
perceptual-object’ in Heselwood 2013: 204. The notion of unascribed phonetic/semantic 
image-correlate also has strong similarities to Peirce’s notion of a ‘First’; e.g. Gorlée 2009.) 
A semantic image or denotable (symbolised as j) consists of an unascribed semantic 
im
neer<, i.e. a particular entity character-
ise
ntic form. This can 
be
d generalisations (clas-
ses
tic
mantic form (g) brought into a relationship (R) with a particular del-
olo
age-correlate or referent (symbolised as ȕ, as discussed above brought into a relation-
ship (symbolised as R) with a particular set-forming criterion (symbolised as b); i.e. it is an 
unascribed semantage-image correlate / denotable which is ascribed to a particular set of 
unascribed semantic-image correlates / denotables (for discussion of this, see Dickins in 
prep.). Thus, semantic image can be defined as j = ȕRb. Semantic image (as a notion) can 
also be symbolised as >ȕ< (as an alternative to i).  
An example of a semantic image is >civil engi
d as belonging to a particular class (or set) of entities all of whose members are con-
ceived of belonging to a class {civil engineers}. A semantic image >civil engineer< can 
thus be more fully symbolised as ȕiR{civil engineers} (i.e. a particular semantic image ȕi, 
conceived as a member a set of semantic images, i.e. {civil engineers}, deemed all to be 
the same except for their time-space individuality). This relating to a particular type of 
what would otherwise merely be an unascribed semantic image-correlate or referent may 
be called its ascription: by ascribing the unascribed semantic image-correlate or referent 
to a particular type/class/set we are giving it a manipulable modelled identity. Semantic 
images can be represented (as with >civil engineer< above) by reverse angle brackets (par-
alleling the use of reverse angle brackets to represent phonetic images). 
The class (set) to which individual semantic images belong is a sema
 defined as {j}, i.e. a class (set) of semantic images (a semantic image being i, as dis-
cussed above). Semantic form is also symbolised in Figure 1 as g. 
Semantic image and semantic form are models for ‘entities’ an
) of these ‘entities’, regardless of the linguistic status of these entities. We can, however, 
consider such ‘entities’ in relation to specific languages, and in particular in relation to the 
abstract semantic entities – i.e. what are called in Figure 1 the delological forms or denota-
tions of specific languages. When we do this, we are moving into the signum ontology 
(proper) of the theory. Semantic forms can be represented using reverse square brackets, 
e.g. ]engineer[  (paralleling the use of reverse square brackets to represent phonetic forms). 
A delete or denotatum is a semantic image (j) brought into a relationship (R) with a par-
ular delological form / denotation (d). That is to say, it is a model for a specific ‘entity in 
relation to a particular language (i.e. realising a delological form / denotation in a particular 
language) Delete is symbolised as jRe. For convenience, I will provide an example of a 
delete, after first providing an example of an allodele (below). Deletes/denotata can be 
represented using angle brackets, e.g. <engineer> (paralleling the use of angle brackets to 
represent phonetes). 
An allodele is a se
gical form / denotation (e). Let us, for the sake of argument, take it that the sense (del-
ological form / denotation) conveyed by the word (signum) ‘engineer’ in English has three 
variant meanings ‘civil engineer’, ‘electrical engineer’, and ‘chemical engineer’. Just as 
[p], [ph] and [p¬] can be analysed as allophones of the phoneme /p/ in English, so [civil 
engineer], [electrical engineer] and [chemical engineer] can be analysed as allode-
les/denotatum-types of the delological form / denotation /engineer/ in English. (Square 
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brackets can be used to represent allodeles/denotatum-types, paralleling the use of square 
brackets to represent allophones, while slant brackets can be used to to mark delological 
forms / denotations, paralleling the use of slant brackets to represent phonological forms / 
figura: thus /engineer/.) A delete is the individual-instance counterpart of an allodele. So, 
an individual realisation (an instantiation) of a delological form / denotation ‘engineer’ 
referring to a specific engineer (civil, electrical or chemical) is a delete. Unlike deletes, 
allodeles / denotatum-types are not individual entities. We can, in fact, also define an al-
lodele as a set of all the deletes which have ever been and could ever be uttered belonging to 
the relevant class (for the delological form / denotation /engineer/ in English there are three 
relevant classes [civil engineer], [electrical engineer] and [chemical engineer], assuming we 
analyse English /engineer/ as having three allodeles [civil engineer], [electrical engineer] 
and [chemical engineer]). As a set of deletes, we can thus symbolise an allodele as {jRe}. 
A delological form or denotation (which for present purposes can be taken to be the 
sam
ripher-
ies
d speech 
ev
e as a delological entity) can be defined as a set of allodeles belonging to the same del-
ological identiy (the same e). Thus the English delological form / denotation /engineer/ can 
be defined as a set of allodeles [civil engineer], [electrical engineer] and [chemical engi-
neer]. Delological form / denotation can be symbolised as q, and defined q={gRe}. 
Having considered entities and notions which are on the sound and meaning ‘pe
’ of the signum ontology (including the ancillary entities of general phonetics and gen-
eral semantics), it is appropriate now to consider the central notion of the theory, the sig-
num or grammatical entity. The signum, symbolised S, is defined as a bi-unity of an ex-
pression (symbolised E) and a content (symbolised C), i.e. S = E&C. An alternative to the 
word ‘signum’ might be ‘sign’ (for the distinction between ‘sign’ and ‘signum’, see Dick-
ins 2009: Def. 2a2). Examples of signa / grammatical entities in English are morphemes 
(e.g. the morphemes ‘un’, ‘luck’ and ‘y’ making up the word ‘unlucky’) words (e.g. the 
word ‘unlucky’) and grammatically ‘coherent’ phrases (e.g. ‘the unlucky man’, or ‘the 
unlucky man needs friends’) – these being understood as abstract entities, not as utterances 
(or models for utterances) which instantiate these signa. A content is the semantic aspect of 
a signum, while an expression is the ‘formal’ (non-semantic) aspect of a signum. 
Signa are instantiated as lexonetes/utterances, symbolised as U, i.e. modelle
ents. The meaningful aspect of a lexonete/utterance is a semonete/reference, symbolised 
as R, and the ‘formal’ (non-meaning-related) aspect of a lexonete/utterance is a morpho-
nete/form, symbolised as F. A lexonete/utterance is thus defined as U=F&R (paralleling 
the definition at the more abstract level of signum as S=E&C). The lexonete/utterance 
(with its form/morphonete and semonete/reference aspects) thus provides a model for an 
instantiation – i.e. an individual realisation at a particular time and place of occurrence – of a 
signum. Morphonetes/forms, lexonetes/utterances and semonetes/references all stand in rela-
tionship to the signum/grammatical entity (symbolised as S, as discussed above), i.e. they all 
have the characteristic Rs (where s stands for ‘signum identity’ / ‘grammatical identity’).  
Morphonete/form, however, can also be related to phonete (discussed above): it is a 
ph
discussed above); i.e. R
onete (symbolised iRd, as discussed above), brought into a relationship with a gram-
matical identity (i.e. Rs, as discussed above); i.e. F=(iRd)Rs. Similarly, semonete/reference 
can be related to delete/denotatum (discussed above): it is a delete/denotatum (symbolised 
jRe, as discussed above), brought into a relationship with a grammatical identity (i.e. Rs, as 
=(jRe)Rs.  
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Just as we can generalise away from individual sound events to classes of sound events 
deemed to be identical apart from their time-space specifities, i.e. just as we can generalise 
fro
tical apart from their time-space specifities,  
i.e
t also to phonological identity (the Rd element in their definition 
(fR
y ab-
str
m a phonete to an allophone, so we can generalise from a morphonete/form to an allo-
morphon. An allomorphon can be conceived as a set of phonetes which are identical except 
for their time-space specificities, i.e. as ({iRd})Rs. Or it can be conceived equivalently as 
an allophone (i.e. fRd) brought into a relationship with a grammatical identity (i.e. Rs), 
giving the definition of allomorphon: (fRd)Rs. 
Correspondingly, just as we can generalise away from individual ‘meaning events’ to 
classes of ‘meaning events’ deemed to be iden
. just as we can generalise from a delete/denotatum to an allodele/denotatum-type, so we 
can generalise from a semonete/reference to an allosemon/reference-type. An allose-
mon/reference-type can thus be conceived as a set of semonetes/references which are iden-
tical except for their time-space specificities, i.e. as ({jRe})Rs. Or it can be conceived 
equivalently as an allodele/denotatum-type (i.e. gRe) brought into a relationship with a 
grammatical identity (i.e. Rs), giving the definition of allosemon/reference-type: (gRe)Rs. 
An alternative term for an allosemon would be a sub-sense, or better ‘signum-sub-sense’ or 
‘sub-sense of a signum’, since it is a notion which is in a direct relation to a signum / 
grammatical entity. 
Allomorphons are related not only to grammatical identity (the Rs element in their defi-
nition: (fRd)Rs), bu
d)Rs). We can thus generalise from allomorphon to establish a set of all allomorphons 
which have the same phonological identity. A set of all allomorphons having the same 
phonological identity is an allomorph, defined as ({fRd})Rs. Since an allomorph is, equiva-
lently, a phonological form (p) brought into a relationship with a grammatical identity (s), 
allomorph can also be defined as pRs. An allomorph in extended axiomatic functionalism 
is roughly the same as an allomorph in traditional linguistics. Examples of allomorphs in 
British English are /ܳærܤޝݤ/ and /ܳærܼdݤ/ as phonological forms of (realising) the signum 
(word) ‘garage’ (assuming /ܳærܤޝݤ/ and /ܳærܼdݤ/ to be valid phonological analyses).  
Correspondingly, allosemons/reference-types are related not only to grammatical iden-
tity (the Rs element in their definition: (gRe)Rs), but also to delological (i.e. ‘purel
act’ semantic) identity (the Re element in their definition (gRe)Rs). We can thus gener-
alise from allosemon/reference-types to establish a set of all allosemons/reference-types 
which have the same delological (‘purely abstract’ semantic) identity. A set of all allose-
mons/reference-types having the same delological identity is an alloseme, defined as 
({gRe})Rs. Since an alloseme is, equivalently, a delological form/denotation (q) brought 
into a relationship with a grammatical identity (s), alloseme can also be defined as qRs. An 
alternative term for an alloseme would be a sense, or better ‘signum-sense’ or ‘sense of a 
signum’, since it is a notion which is in a direct relation to a signum / grammatical entity. 
An alloseme is roughly equivalent to the sense word or phrase (or even a morpheme) as 
understood pre-theoretically, e.g. in lexicography. Examples of allosemes in English (as-
suming the analyses to be valid) are the senses of ‘garage’ޝ 1. “Building, either private or 
public, intended for the storage and shelter of motor vehicles while not in use”; 2. “Com-
mercial establishment that sells petrol, oil, and similar products and freq. also undertakes 
the repair and servicing of motor vehicles” (definitions from Oxford English Dictionary). 
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It is possible to further generalise from an allomorph to expression (symbolised E), an 
expression being a set of allomorphs having the same grammatical identity, i.e. E={pRs}. 
It 
.e. unascribed phonetic image correlate, unascribed 
sem
.1 Extralinguistic- and linguistic-based associative meaning revisited 
 word ‘nurse’, first 
iscussed in Section 3.1; the same analytical principles, however, apply also to vernietigen 
tic-image correlate (= referent) of ‘nurse’ is the same as that of 
ister’ (they refer to the same entity). The ascription in the case of ‘nurse’ and ‘sister’ is, 
 an ad hoc matter, depending on how many ascriptions 
we
ld have been done in another 
wa
is correspondingly possible to further generalise from an alloseme to content (symbol-
ised C), a content being a set of allosemes having the same grammatical identity, i.e. 
C={qRs}. As noted, above a sigum / grammatical entity (symbolised S) is a bi-unity of an 
expression and content, i.e. S=E&C. 
In the remainder of this paper, I will in almost all cases make use of the terminologi-
cally integrated terms throughout: i
antic image correlate, phonetic image, phonetic form, semantic image, semantic form, 
phonete, allophone, phonological form, delete, allodele, delological form, mophonete, al-
lomorphon, allomorph, semonete, allosemon, and alloseme – plus expression, content and 
signum. There are three reasons for this: (i) these terms express the relationships between 
the entities in the theory most clearly (more clearly than more ad-hoc terms such as ‘denot-
able’, ‘denotatum’, or ‘reference’); (ii) other terms, such as ‘denotable’, ‘denotatum’ or 
‘reference’ are used in other theories and other contexts with different meanings to those 
which they have in this paper, and their use here might therefore be confusing; (iii) use of 
multiple terms (e.g. ‘allosemon/reference-type/sub-sense’ would be long-winded and con-
fusing, rather than helping to clarify what is meant); (iv) inconsistent use of terms (e.g. use 
of a terminologically integrated term, such as ‘allosemon’, followed closely by use of a 
terminologically non-integrated term with the same sense, such as ‘reference-type’) would 
be confusing. 
 
 
4
 
Consider the following (in the following paragraphs, I will consider the
d
and vernielen, discussed in Section 3.2): 
 
(1) My sister is a nurse. 
 
In 1, the unascribed seman
‘s
of course, different. Focusing on ‘nurse’ (though the same general arguments apply to ‘sis-
ter’), we may regard the ascription as the type/class/set of nurses in the full extension of 
‘nurse’ (in the relevant alloseme).  
It needs to be noted that the number of allodeles we establish (e.g. for the English de-
lological form ‘nurse’) is ultimately
 establish. This becomes more obvious when we consider the formal (non-meaning-
related) analogue of the allodele, the allophone.  
The number of allophones we establish (e.g. for the English phoneme /p/) is ultimately 
an ad hoc matter (i.e. it is ultimately conventional, and cou
y – though it could not, of course, reasonably be done in any way one wanted: some 
ways of analysing phenomena are reasonable, while others definitely are not). Thus, the 
English phoneme /p/ might be said to have the allophones [p] (unaspirated ‘p’), [ph] (aspi-
rated ‘p’), and [p¬] (unreleased ‘p’). However, if we were to adopt a more detailed (nar-
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rower) phonetic analysis, we could establish many more allophones for English /p/ than 
this. Alternatively, if we had a less detailed (broader) phonetic analysis, we might say that 
English /p/ had only two allophones (e.g. [p] and [ph]), or even just one allophone (which 
we might represent as [p]). 
The allophone (also phonetic form, phonete, and phonetic image) is dependent on the 
notion of ascription: the number of allophones we deem a phoneme (or other phonological 
en
oc matter, depending on how many ascriptions we establish. 
Be
 have the 
asc
ith ascriptions in phonetic analysis re-
lat
f the relative frequencies of different reali-
sat
tity) to have depends on how many relevant ascriptions (ascriptional types/classes/sets) 
we establish. Thus if we establish three relevant ascriptions, R{p}, R{ph} and R{p¬}, we 
have three allophones of /p/ in English: [p], [ph] and [p¬]. If, however, we were to establish 
only one ascription R{p} (covering the full range of realisations of English /p/), we would 
have only one allophone [p]. 
Similarly, the number of allodeles we establish (e.g. for the English delological form 
‘nurse’) is ultimately an ad h
cause it is easier to work in relation to signa (e.g. words) rather than in relation to pure 
delological forms, we can rephrase this to include relationship to signum (e.g. word). We 
can thus say that the number of allosemons we establish (e.g. for the relevant English sig-
num ‘nurse’, in the relevant alloseme) is dependent on how many ascriptions we establish. 
We might, accordingly establish a single ascription for ‘nurse’ (in the relevant alloseme) 
R{nurse}, i.e. an ascription which covers the full extensional range of ‘nurse’ in the rele-
vant sense. In this case, ‘nurse’ in the example ‘My sister is a nurse’ would have the as-
cription R{nurse} (as the only ascription available), and thus the delete <nurse>. 
Alternatively, however, we could establish two different ascriptions: R{male nurse) and 
R{female nurse}. In this case, ‘nurse’ in the example ‘My sister is a nurse’ would
ription R{female nurse} and thus the delete <female nurse> (on the basis that the nurse 
in question, being my sister – and not, for instance, my brother – must be female). Alterna-
tively again, we could establish four different ascriptions: R{young male nurse}, R{young 
female nurse}, R{old male nurse}, and R{old female nurse}. Assuming the nurse in ques-
tion is young (as well as female), ‘nurse’ here would have the ascription R{young female 
nurse}, and thus the delete <young female nurse>. 
One factor in how many ascriptions we decide to establish is what we are attempting to 
do in our analysis of the data – as is also the case w
ing to phonological analysis. Thus, if we are a phonetician wanting to investigate in 
great detail the relative frequencies of minutely different realisations of the phoneme /p/ in 
English, we will want to establish an extremely large number of different ascriptions – and 
thus different phonetic forms and allophones. Similarly, if we are a semanticist wanting to 
investigate in great detail the relative frequencies of different types of things (entities) 
which the signum ‘nurse’ (in the relevant alloseme) in English is used to refer to, we will 
want to establish a large number of ascriptions. 
Extended axiomatic functionalism in fact provides a straightforward means of doing this 
kind of statistically based analysis. In the case o
ions of phonological entities (phonemes, etc.), we (i) establish a large number (a corpus) 
of relevant speech events (utterances, in the general sense of the term), which we believe to 
be representative; (ii) establish a set of relevant ascriptions (e.g. for realisations of the pho-
neme /p/ in English), which we believe to be adequate for the phonetic detail which we 
require; (iii) apply the ascriptions which we have to the relevant aspects of the utterance-
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set (corpus), to yield phonetes; and (iv) analyse the phonetes statistically (by counting 
them) according to the allophone which each belongs to. 
We can correspondingly investigate the relative frequencies of different realisations of 
delological forms (i.e. to establish what a particular signum, such as a word, typically 
me
ets as we want. We can decide to operate 
wi
lls us nothing about the ways in which the possible range of 
me
 insights into human communication 
(m
 refer to  – and ‘actively mean’ – 
 female nurse, rather than a male nurse. Here, we can only reasonably say that the ascrip-
                                                
ans in a particular alloseme). To do this, we (i) establish a large number (a corpus) of 
relevant speech events (utterances, in the general sense of the term), which we believe to 
be representative; (ii) establish a set of relevant ascriptions (e.g. for realisations of the del-
ological form ‘nurse’ in English), which we believe to be adequate for the semantic detail 
which we require; (iii) apply the ascriptions which we have to the relevant aspects of the 
utterance-set (corpus), to yield deletes (and by extension semonetes); and (iv) analyse the 
deletes (by extension semonetes) statistically (by counting them) according to the allodele 
(by extension allosemon) to which each belongs. 
Ascription for semantic analysis of the above kind is ultimately ad hoc; we can make 
use of as few or as many different types/classes/s
th intuitively sensible ascriptions for ‘nurse’ (in the relevant alloseme), such as R{female 
nurses} and R{male nurses}. We could, however, also decide to operate with intuitively 
bizarre ascriptions, e.g. R{nurses who regularly eat seaweed} vs. R{nurses who do not 
regularly eat seaweed}.  
This kind of deployment of ascription does not tell us anything about human communi-
cation – and in particular, it te
anings of a signum (word, etc.) are communicatively restricted in specific contexts. As 
the example ‘My sister is a nurse’ shows, it does not matter whether we consider the as-
cription to be R{nurse}, or R{female nurse}, or R{old female nurse} (provided these are 
all reasonable – true, or similar – in the context). Since this deployment of ascription pro-
vides no insights into human communication (and in particular into ‘meaning-restriction’), 
we can refer to it as non-communicative ascription. 
Non-communicative ascription can, however, be contrasted with communicative ascrip-
tion – i.e. cases in which ascription does provide
eaning-restriction). Communicative ascription most obviously obtains where the ascrip-
tion provides an allosemon – as intended by the speaker/writer – of the overall denotative 
range (expressed by the delological form) of a signum (e.g. word) in a particular alloseme. 
Particularly clear examples of this are found where an indefinite noun has a non-specific 
reference (cf. Lyons 1999), i.e. where what is being referred to is not something specific 
but some-or-other example of the relevant type. Consider the following example: 
 
(2) John wants a romantic relationship with a nurse. 
 
Under most circumstances, ‘nurse’ here would be taken to
a
tion (i.e. communicative ascription) is R{female nurse} – ignoring the question of whether 
non-specificity (to be distinguished from indeterminacy: Section 5.1.1) is to be treated as a 
feature of the ascription or a feature of the unascribed semantic-image correlate.3   
 
3 The question of whether specificity and non-specificity are a feature of the ascription or the referent, raises 
challenges for the current approach. An attempt to deal with these, however, would go well beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
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Corresponding examples occur with non-nouns. A good example is the word (signum) 
‘do’ in English (in the relevant alloseme). As discussed in Dickins (1998: 221–222), ‘do’ 
in 
 Consider the following: 
 
writer means here that the brain is like a computer in 
at is made out of silicon, or that it is probably produced in East Asia, or that it involves 
here one allosemon 
is 
. A formal analysis of scalar-implicature based associative meaning 
tion to sca-
r implicature. I will argue that there are three different kinds of phenomena involved  – 
I turn now to a formal analysis of scalar implicature-based associative meaning involving 
                             
‘I want to do my hair’ can be used to mean, among other things, ‘I want to wash my 
hair’, or ‘I want to dry my hair’, or ‘I want to comb my hair’ – or all three at once, or many 
other things, or combinations of other things (examples adapted from Moore and Carling 
1982: 131–132). It is also perfectly reasonable to say, ‘When I said I wanted to do my hair, 
I meant I wanted to comb it, not to wash it’. Here we are dealing with ascriptions which are 
– in the local context at least – communicative and not simply ad hoc. The relevant ascrip-
tions – R{wash}, R{dry}, R{comb}}, R{wash, dry and comb}, etc. – are intended by the 
speaker (as is clear from the reasonableness of ‘When I said I wanted to do my hair, I 
meant I wanted to comb it, not to wash it’). 
Another clear example where the ascription is communicative is provided by the sig-
num (word) ‘like’ (in the relevant alloseme).
(3) The brain is like a computer. 
 
It is very unlikely that the speaker/
th
solid-state circuitry; and much more likely that he or she means that the brain is like a 
computer in terms of its more abstract organisation. Here the ascription R{like in terms of 
its abstract organisation} or similar (and thus the corresponding allosemon) is imposed by 
considerations of plausibility (general and/or in the specific context), and other ascriptions 
(e.g. R{like in that it is made out of silicon} are specifically excluded.4 
In the following sections, I will consider further examples of where the ascription and 
thus the allosemon is communicative, particularly in relation to cases w
properly included within one another (as it is with the ascriptions of ‘do’, in the relevant 
alloseme, with the ascriptions R{wash} and R{wash, dry and comb} discussed above). 
 
 
5
 
In the following sections, 5.1–5.3.2, I will consider associative meaning in rela
la
those which involve hyperonymy-hyponymy (Section 5.1), those which involve what I 
shall call ‘quasi-hyponymy’ (Section 5.2), and those which involve what I shall call ‘pseu-
do-hyponymy’ (‘para-referentiality’) (Section 5.3). 
 
5.1 Scalar implicature and hyperonymy 
 
hyperonymy-hyponymy using relevant aspects of the model of extended axiomatic func-
tionalism discussed in Sections 4–4.1). 
                    
4 In traditional rhetoric, the element in addition to ‘like’ is known as the grounds (in fact, particularly in rela-
tion to metaphor, rather than simile). Thus, in R{like in terms of its abstract organisation}, the grounds is in 
terms of its abstract organisation (e.g. Dickins 2005).  
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Figure 2 
 Hyperonymy-Hyponymy Semantic overlap Semantic disjunction 
Ø ¥It’s a car, a hatchback 
¥It’s big, very big 
¥It’s a lorry, a juggernaut 5 
*It’s big, useful *?It’s big, small 
¥It’s a jet, a jumbo (jet) 
‘and’ *It’
naut 
¥It’ *?s a car and a hatchback 
*It’s big and very big 
ugger*It’s a lorry and a j
*It’s a jet and a jumbo (jet) 
s big and useful It’s big and small 
‘and not’ ack 
naut 
) 
¥?It’s big and not useful *It’s big and not small ?It’s a car and not a hatchb
?It’s big and not very big 
jugger?It’s a lorry and not a 
?It’s a jet and not a jumbo (jet
‘but’ ¥It’s big but useful *It’s big but small ¥?It’s a car but a hatchback 
*It’s big but very big 
ut *It’s a lorry but a juggerna
¥?It’s a jet but a jumbo (jet) 
‘not’ 
 
?It’s big not useful ¥It’s big not small *It’s a car, not a hatchback 
*?It’s big, not very big 
ernaut*It’s a lorry not a jugg
*It’s a jet not a jumbo (jet) 
‘not’– with 
al of 
y 
?It’s useful not big ¥It’s small not big 
revers
terms 
*?It’s a hatchback, not a car 
*?It’s very big not big 
 lorr*?It’s a juggernaut not a
*?It’s a jumbo (jet) not a jet 
 
‘but not’ ck 
aut 
) 
¥It’s big but not useful *It’s big but not small ¥It’s a car but not a hatchba
¥It’s big but not very big 
¥It’s a lorry but not a juggern
¥It’s a jet, but not a jumbo (jet
‘in fact’  *It’s big , in fact useful      *It’s big, in fact small ¥It’s a car, in fact a hatchback
¥It’s big, in fact very big 
ernaut ¥It’s a lorry, in fact a jugg
¥It’s a jet, in fact a jumbo (jet) 
‘not in fact’ k 
-
*It’s big, not in fact useful ¥It’s big, not in fact small*It’s a car, not in fact a hatchbac
*It’s big, not in fact very big 
jugger*It’s a lorry, not in fact a 
naut 
*It’s a jet, not  in fact a jumbo 
(jet)  
not just’ ¥?It’s a hatchback, not just a car 
¥?It’s not just a car, it’s a hatch-
back 
¥It’s very big, not just big 
¥It’s not just big, it’s very big 
¥It’s noa juggernaut, t just a lorry 
¥It’s not just big, it’s 
useful 
*It’s not just big, it’s 
small 
¥It’s useful, not just big *It’s small, not just big 
                                                 
5 ‘Lorry’ is British English for American ‘truck’. A ‘juggernaut’ is a large lorry. 
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¥It’s not just a lorry, it’s a jugger-
naut 
¥It’s a jumbo (jet), not just a jet 
bo ¥It’s not just a jet, it’s a jum
(jet) 
 
Although the lso Figures 8 and 11, below) are largely based 
on examples which are f terature and are intended to point up the 
kind of semantic contrasts which are of interest to this paper, they have been chosen on a 
rather intuitive basis (som perhaps unavoidable, given the undeveloped na-
re of ‘associative meaning’ as an area of enquiry). The acceptability judgements for Fig-
ugh it also has oth-
er 
ections of this paper. For the moment, we may say that 
 re forced to choose, between a peripheral interpretation of what is 
eant by ‘big’ – e.g. ‘very big’ or ‘big, but only a little bit big’ – or a core interpretation –
‘huge’ in Sections 5.2–5.2.1.1. 
                                                
examples used in Figure 2 (a
ound elsewhere in the li
ething which is 
tu
ure 2 are largely my own (though I have informally tried some of them out on other people 
(including my wife). Use of a survey with multiple respondents would no doubt improve 
the reliability of the results. As Figure 2 shows, hyperonymy-hyponymy pairs, such as 
‘car-hatchback’, ‘big-very big’, ‘lorry-juggernaut’, and ‘jet-jumbo (jet)’ function fairly 
similarly to one another, but rather differently from semantic overlap-pairs, such as ‘big’ 
and ‘useful’, and semantic disjunction-pairs, such as ‘big’ and ‘small’. 
 ‘Hatchback’ and ‘car’ are not related in scalar terms – the relationship between ‘car’ 
and ‘hatchback’ is not one of size. The other terms considered in the hyperonymy-
hyponymy column do, however, stand in a scalar relationship to one another: a juggernaut 
is a very big lorry (and may have other features, apart from size, which distinguish it from 
a more standard kind of lorry), a jumbo / jumbo jet is a very big jet (tho
distinctive features such as shape, which distinguish it from a more standard kind of jet), 
and something which is very big is bigger than something which is (just) big. There also 
seems to be no doubt that all three cases involve hyperonymy-hyponymy: a juggernaut is a 
type of lorry, a jumbo (jet) is a type of jet, and something which is very big is also big (but 
not vice versa; i.e. very bigness is a type of bigness, if one likes). 
Consider the following example: 
 
(4) The house is big.6 
 
Example 4 would in many contexts be taken to mean ‘The house is big (but not very big)’, 
d as meaning ‘big but not very big’. (The specific issues i.e. ‘big’ here would be understoo
re investigated in the following sa
if, as a hearer/reader we a
m
i.e. ‘big in the middle of the scale of what counts as big’ – we will normally chose the core 
interpretation.) In fact, the related claim typically made in the literature (e.g. Levinson 
2000) is that in the ‘The house is big’, ‘big’ means ‘big but not huge’. The interpretation 
‘big but not very big’ is also valid, however, I believe. ‘Big’ will be discussed in relation to 
 
6 A significant shortcoming of the great majority of works on scalar implicature is that they fail to take into-
nation into account – or that they fail to take it into sufficient account. The current paper sadly perpetuates 
this shortcoming. Lack of sufficient context is a further problem. In this paper, I have tried to overcome this 
by providing detailed context where this seems necessary (though space restrictions preclude providing very 
detailed context for all examples).  
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Contrast this with the following example: 
 
(5) The house is big, in fact very big. 
 
Here ‘big’ cannot be understood to mean ‘big but not very big’. Rather, for the following 
phrase ‘in fact very big’ to make sense, it has to be understood along the lines ‘big includ-
ing
Going back to the referent-plus-ascription (unascribed semantic-image correlate plus 
 in Section 4, we can say that ‘big’ (in the relevant 
lloseme) has two allosemons: 1. [big excluding very big] and 2. [big including very big] 
big}, but in an utterance ‘The house is big, in fact very 
big
orate (in their definition) allodeles. 
Th
nical ‘allo-form’ 
(w
 (the possibility of) very big’. 
ascription) model of meaning discussed
a
and therefore two ascriptions R{big excluding very big}, and R{big including very big}, 
both of which are communicative. In an utterance ‘The house is big’, we typically have the 
ascription R{big excluding very 
’, we have the ascription R{big including very big}. 
In fact, if we are considering the word ‘big’ (and not simply an abstract semantic ‘no-
tion’, i.e. allodele, such as [big excluding very big]), we are making reference at one and 
the same time to signum identity and semantic identity, i.e. we are bringing a particular 
allodele, gRe or {j}Re, into a relationship (R) with a signum (s); i.e. we are dealing not 
with an allodele, but with an allosemon (see Section 4): (gRe)Rs or ({j}Re)Rs, allosemons 
having the same nature as allodeles, because they incorp
us, we may say that the signum (word) ‘big’ in English has (in the relevant alloseme; 
see Section 4), for the purposes relevant to thinking about scalar implicature, two commu-
nicative allosemons [big excluding very big] and [big including very big]. 
It is useful at this point to introduce the notion of canonicality. While canonicality is not 
strictly speaking part of extended axiomatic functionalism, it can be applied insightfully to 
all ‘allo-notions’ in extended axiomatic functionalism: allophone, allomorphon, allosemon, 
allodele, allomorph, and alloseme. Canonicality can be considered from a number of per-
spectives, and can also be related to other notions such as prototypicality (cf. Dickins 1998: 
310–315). The simplest – though not the only – way of thinking of a cano
hat is technically known in extended axiomatic functionalism as an allont: Dickins 
1998: 137) is that it is that ‘allo-form’ which occurs most frequently (cf. Dickins 1998: 
253–257). The canonical allosemon is thus that allosemon which occurs predominantly. 
Canonical allosemons can be investigated quantitatively, by analysing statistically a repre-
sentative sample (corpus) of utterances (both in the general sense and the specific extended 
axiomatic-functionalist sense) (as discussed in Section 4.1). Thus in the case of the signum 
(word) ‘big’ in the alloseme ‘large / not small’ (etc.), we can investigate, by counting indi-
vidual deletes relating to individual utterances, what proportion ‘belong to’ (realise) the 
allosemon ‘big’ [big excluding very big] (involving the ascription R{big excluding very 
big}), and what proportion ‘belong to’ (realise) the allosemon [big including very big] (in-
volving the ascription R{big including very big}). In conducting this kind of analysis, one 
can make use of non-communicative ascriptions only, communicative ascriptions only, or 
both non-communicative and communicative ascriptions. 
Canonical allosemon can in fact be identified with associative meaning. The word ‘big’ 
has the associative meaning – i.e. canonical allosemon – [big excluding very big] (i.e. the 
ascription R{big excluding very big}). In the case of the signum (word) ‘nurse’ (Section 
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4.1) (in the relevant alloseme) an obvious canonical allosemon to identify is [female nurse] 
involving the ascription R{female nurse}. Similarly, in the case of vernietigen we can 
identify a canonical allosemon [destroy abstractly] (and ascription R{destroy abstractly}), 
wh
n an extended axiomatic-functionalist 
nalysis two allosemes, e.g. ‘He’s funny’ meaning either ‘He’s amusing’ or ‘He’s odd’ (cf. 
lso ‘He’s funny in both senses [of the word]’; Dickins 1998: 193–215; 202–219). Inde-
tionalist analysis two allose-
ons (e.g. whether ‘do’ in ‘I want to do my hair’ means ‘wash’ or ‘dry’, etc; Section 4.1; 
ities]’ (with the ascription R{big [entities]}. Con-
sid
e allosemons [big including very big] and [big excluding very 
ig]. That is to say, ‘big’ here indeterminately has the ascription R{big including very big 
ig [entity]}; and it is possible that this inde-
termi
ile in the case of vernielen we can identify a canonical allosemon [destroy physically] 
(and ascription R{destroy physically}; Section 3.2). 
 
 
5.1.1 Interminacy of referent vs. indeterminacy of ascription 
 
A distinction is frequently made in linguistics between ambiguity and indeterminacy. Am-
biguity involves lack of clarity between what are i
a
a
terminacy involves what are in an extended axiomatic-func
m
also Dickins 1998: 221–223; 269–274). 
It has already been argued (Section 5.1) that ‘big’ can be taken to have two allosemons 
[big including very big] and [big excluding very big]. In an utterance ‘The house is big’, 
‘house’ and ‘big’ have the same unascribed semantic-image correlate (referent). However, 
in using ‘house’ and ‘big’ we are ascribing the entity in question to two different classes 
(sets): the class of houses – the ascription being R{houses}, and the class which we may 
provisionally classify as that of ‘big [ent
er now the following (with possible variants ‘written in’, as indicated by the forward 
slashes and square brackets): 
 
(6) A. The house is big. / Is the house big? 
B. Yes, [in fact] it’s very big. / No, [it’s not big], it’s very big. 
 
As speaker B’s answers to speaker A’s statement/question show, ‘big’ as used by speaker 
A is indeterminate between th
b
[entity]} or the class R{big excluding very b
nacy is radical, in that the speaker themselves intends it.7 
                                                 
7 As well as indeterminacy of ascription (indeterminacy in the normal sense), it is also possible to have inde-
terminacy of referent (unascribed semantic-image correlate), particularly one which is indeterminate for 
(unclear to) the hearer/reader. This is brought out in exchanges of the following type: A. ‘Can you see that 
bird?’; B. ‘Which one?’. Non-universal quantifiers, such as ‘some’, ‘many’ and ‘most’ typically have inde-
terminate referents. If I show you a photo of a group of people, and say “[These are] some friends of mine”, 
the referent is determinate: I am referring to the people in the photo, and no other people. If, however, some-
one says to me, “Do you know all the people in the room?”, and I reply “[I know] some of them”, my refer-
ent is likely to be indeterminate. I may well not have looked at everyone present to check whether I know 
them or not. All that’s needed for ‘some’ to be reasonable here is for me to have checked that there are peo-
ple in the room that I know (and also, in the context, that there is at least one person whom I don’t know). 
Who exactly is being referred to by ‘some’ in this context is not entirely clear. 
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5.1.2 Allosemons compared to allophones 
 
Semonetes and allosemons (and, by abstraction from grammatical identity, deletes and 
allodeles) present a number of interesting contrasts with phonetes and allophones (and, 
with inclusion of grammatical identity, morphonetes and allomorphons). 
A delete may be indeterminate as to ascription; it may not be knowable which class (set) 
the entity in question is being ascribed to (cf. ‘Is this house big?’). In the case of phonetes 
this kind of indeterminacy does not exist; once we have established an agreed set of pho-
netic forms for a particular description/analysis (e.g. ]p[, ]ph[ and ]p¬[), we can ascribe 
each phonete to one of these sets as an instantiation of an allophone [p], [ph] or [p¬]. 
There is a further significant feature of ascription (as an aspect) of allodeles and allose-
mons. Consider the previously discussed allosemons of ‘big’ in set-theoretical terms: a. 
‘big including very big’, and b. ‘big excluding very big’ (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 
 
   a. ‘big including very big’ 
 
 
 
            (very big) 
 
 
 
 
Allosemon b. [big excluding very big] is properly included within allosemon a. [big includ-
ing very big]: all entities which are big but not (= excluding) very big are also big includ-
ing very big, but not vice versa. Very big entities thus belong to class a. but not class b. 
The term autohyponymy is sometimes used to describe a situation in which one alloseme 
of a word (signum) is properly included (extensionally) within another (cf. Geeraerts 1993: 
237); another term for this would be autohyposemy. Cruse (1986: 59) very elegantly shows 
that ‘bitch’ in English has distinct senses (allosemes, in terms of the current approach) ‘ca-
nine’ and ‘female dog’, the second of which is properly included within the first – i.e. that 
this is a case of autohyponymy (or autohyposemy) (cf. also Dickins 1998: 205–208).  
 ‘Big’ (in the relevant alloseme/sense) having two allosemons 1. [big excluding very 
big] and 2. [big including very big] (the first being properly included within the second) is 
not a case of autohyponymy (autohyposemy), since only one alloseme is involved. Rather, 
since we are dealing with allosemons, this situation could be termed auto-hyposemony. 
The word (signum) ‘big’ (in the relevant alloseme) can be termed auto-hyposemonic (or 
auto-hyposemonous).  
The first ‘smaller’ allosemon of ‘big’ (in the relevant alloseme) [big excluding very big] 
 
b. ‘big excluding very big’
(properly included within the second ‘larger’ allosemon [big including very big]) we can 
refer to as the narrow allosemon, while the second ‘larger’ allosemon [big including very 
big] we can refer to as the broad allosemon. 
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This situation contrasts dramatically with that in phonetics/allophonics. Once we have 
stablished – for whatever purpose – a set of phonetic forms as the phonetic forms of a 
imagine that we 
co
onetic 
ran
 was analysable as the 
llophone [Ĭ], it would necessarily also be analysable as the allophone [ȁ] – and there 
would be no particular reason to adopt one analysis rather than the other. In order to 
chieve non-ad-hoc analyses, allophones have to be conceived of as having non-
overlapping extensions. 
The fundamental reason for these discrepancies between morphontic/expression-side 
orm-related) and semantic/content-side (m tities is that languages (like 
ther semiotic systems) are ‘encode hysical phenomena (vocal 
unds arks on paper) but only ‘point’ mediately to the entities they mean: these entities 
re outside language itself. 
.2 Scalar implicature and quasi-hyponymy 
 to a 
va
in question as ‘(both) X and Y’, e.g. ‘the box is (both) big and use-
ful
e
corresponding set of allophones, e.g. [p], [ph] and [p¬] as the allophones of English /p/, 
there is no possibility – or virtue – in one of these allophones being properly included in 
another ‘super-allophone’, e.g. ‘[p]plus[ph]’. We might, for example, 
uld in principle establish two different allophones for a particular phoneme (in a particu-
lar language), the extension of the first of which was properly included in the extension of 
the other. An example would be an allophone which we can call [Ĭ], and another allo-
phone which we can call [ȁ] of a phoneme which we can call /Ȇ/ (in a particular lan-
guage), such that the phonetic range of [Ĭ] was properly included within the ph
ge of [ȁ]. (All occurrences of [Ĭ] would accordingly also be occurrences of [ȁ], but 
not vice versa.) There would, however, be no virtue in practice of doing this because it 
would lead to ad hoc analyses: if we had a realisation of /Ȇ/ which
a
a
(f eaning-related) en
d’ immediately into po
so , m
a
 
 
5
 
In the following sections I will consider a form of scalar implicature which involves ‘qua-
si-hyponymy’ – i.e. a semantic relation which, although rather like a true hyperonymy-
hyponymy relation, is in fact subtly different. 
 
 
5.2.1 Realisational (concrete) overlap vs. abstract disjunction 
 
Labov (1972) showed that English speakers distinguish cups from mugs according
riety of features including the shape of the vessel concerned. What are of interest here 
are not the focus or details of Labov’s analysis, but the following facts: (i) there are nu-
merous objects which a speaker might describe as a cup or a mug (and one might even say, 
for example, ‘You could call that a cup or a mug’), and (ii) that ‘cup’ and ‘mug’ are not, 
apparently, examples of semantic overlap. In cases of semantic overlap, one can describe 
the entity (object, etc.) 
’, or ‘he’s (both) a doctor and a magician’. One cannot say, however, of a particular rel-
evant vessel, however, ‘It’s (both) a cup and a mug’. Conceptually (abstractly) cups and 
mugs are quite distinct, even though there is an overlap in the real-world objects which 
they may refer to. 
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The combination of abstract discreteness with real-world (realisational) overlap is well 
known in phonology. It is illustrated by budding and butting (and similar intervocalic ‘d’-
‘t’ pairs) in most dialects of American English. These are typically pronounced with an 
intervocalic medial flap (or median tap in the IPA system) [ݐ]. In careful speech, however, 
the first will have a [d] and the second a [t] (as noted in Port and O’Dell 1985: 465; cf. 
Shimizu and Lamb 1985: 109; also Dickins 1998: 91; Dickins 2007: 15).  
Here, the phonological distinction (discreteness) between /d/ and /t/ is demonstrated by 
the fact that there are realisations (pronunciations) of ‘budding’ (those with a medial [d]), 
which cannot also be realisations of ‘butting’, and realisations of ‘butting’ (those with a 
medial [t]), which cannot also be realisations of ‘budding’. Where there is a medial [ݐ], this 
may be a realisation either of /d/ or of /t/. 
This situation of phonological discreteness vs. realisational (allophonic) overlap can be 
represented as in Figure 4: 
 
Figure 4 
Phonological discreteness vs. realisational overlap of /d/ and /t/ in American English 
  
 
          
 
      [t]        Realisations 
emantics of ‘cup’ and ‘mug’, as in Figure 5: 
Figure 5 
’ and ‘mug’ in English 
 
     realisations of /cup/     
     
 
Phonology      /d/           /t/ 
 
            
 
      
Allophonics     Realisations   
   of /d/     [d]      [ݐ] 
       
                       of /t/ 
          
   
his same basic analysis can be applied to the sT
 
Abstract discreteness vs. realisational overlap of ‘cup
 
 
 
Delology      /cup/           /mug/ 
(cf. allosemics) 
            
 
           realisations of /cup/ which     
Allodelics    Realisations cannot also be     realisations of     Realisations 
(cf.     of /cup/ realisations of       /mug/ which    of  /mug/ 
allosemonics)   /mug/     cannot also be 
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5.2
inal /d/ may be 
rea
ed as: [bacat] 
 
 ‘he sent’ are, in set-theoretical terms, properly included with-
 those of bacad ‘after, following’. This situation is distinct from that of budding vs. butt-
ing given above. In the case of budding , while there is realisational overlap be-
t  
] respectively) which are unambiguously distinct from those of all realisa-
ons of the other word. 
In the case of bacad ‘after, following’ vs. bacat ‘he sent’, there are no realisations of ba-
rom cad, although there are realisations 
f bacad cad], which are unambiguously distinct from those of bacat.  
The f dding vs. butting establishes the principle that realisational overlap – i.e. 
l non-dist nction t the a lophonic level – is compatible with different phonemes – i.e. 
atic level. The application of this principle 
c ads to th ns of bacad as [ba-
cat] inv lve re  of th e e phoneme /t/, while 
c c e case of 
logical identity. 
 
nt to 
etation. We do not really know what the extensional bounds are of realisations of 
ny other phoneme for that matter): all we can ultimately do is impose some rea-
sonable, but inevitably arbitrary, limits. What I have analysed as realisations of /d/, in bacad 
d-final /d/) may involve different de-
82: 2 e we can only determine the exten-
s of realisations of /t/ on ultimately arbitrary (though reasonable) grounds, the 
point at which we determine realisations of /d/ (as [t]) to be indistinguishable from valid re-
alisations (as opposed to unacceptable mispronunciations) of /t/ is also ultimately arbitrary.  
lisational overlap can 
r ented re 6:
.1.1 Quasi-hyponymy: realisational overlap, abstract discreteness and scalar implicature 
 
Having considered realisational overlap in relation to abstract discreteness (disjunction), I 
want now to consider a slightly different phenomenon: realisational proper inclusion in 
relation to abstract discreteness. In respect of phonology, an example is provided by Cen-
tral Urban Sudanese Arabic, where final unstressed post-vocalic word-f
lised as voiced [d] or voiceless [t], while unstressed post-vocalic word-final /t/ can only 
be realised as unvoiced [t] (cf. Mustapha 1982: 226; Dickins 2007: 16–18). Thus: 
 
ba
c
ad ‘after, following’ realised as: [bacad] or [bacat] 
ba
c
at ‘he sent’  realis
Here the realisations of bacat
in
vs. butting
ween the two words (in pronunciations involving [ݐ]), there are realisations of both words
(with [d] and [t
ti
c
at which are unambiguously distinct f those of ba
o , i.e. as [ba
case o  bu
partia i a l
(full) phonological distinction – at the phonem
to the example of bacad vs. ba eat le  conclusion that realisatio
alisations e phon me /d/ and not realisations of tho
io  ba t] v isations of the phrealisat ns of at as [ba a  invol e real oneme /t/: as in th
budding vs. butting, phonetic identity does not necessarily imply phono
(For further discussion in support of this conclusion, see Dickins 2007: 18–19.) 
As is also pointed out in Dickins (2007: 18–19): 
In fact, in the case of bacad vs. bacat there is also a common-sensical phonetic eleme
this interpr
/d/ or /t/ (or a
(and other words involving unstressed post-vocalic wor
voicing (cf. Mustapha 19 26 […]). Sincgrees of de
sional bound
 
This situation of phonological discreteness in combination with rea
be rep es  as in Figu  
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Figure 6 
Phonological discreteness vs. realisational proper inclusion of /d/ and /t/ in Central 
 
 
          Realisations of /d/ ([d] and [t])     
Urban Sudanese Arabic 
  
 
 
Phonology      /d/           /t/ 
 
 
            
   
        
Allophonics              [d]          [t]        
      
      
I w
(7)
 
 
 
Delol
(cf. al
 
 
        
Allod
f. 
     
Realisations of /t/ ([t] only)    
         
 
ill now turn to what I believe to be the corresponding situation to this in semantics. 
Consider the following: 
 
 A mountain is a very large hill. 
(8) A mountain is larger than a hill. 
 
Both of these statements seem fairly reasonable (5 being perhaps more reasonable than 4). 
They also, however, seem to be mutually exclusive (contradictory). An analysis of abstract 
semantic (delological) discreteness vs. realisational (alodelic) proper inclusion, as repre-
sented in Figure 7, provides a possible answer to this conundrum.  
 
Figure 7 
 
ogy      /hill/       /mountain/ 
losemics) 
         
elics                Realisations of /hill/  
                  (c
allosemonics)              Realisations of  /mountain/ 
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As with the ‘budding’ / ‘butting’ example in relation to phonology and allophonics, what 
th -
tremis at least, be referred to as !’), but not every entity 
 referred to as a hill can also be referred to as a mountain.8  Properly speak-
g, we are talking here about words (signa) in particular senses (allosemes), rather than 
bout abstract senses (delological forms): thus, it is more coherent to talk about allosemes 
ical forms and their allodelic realisa-
ons (cf. corresponding remarks made about ‘cup’ and ‘mug’; Section 5.2.1, above). 
While any entity which can be referred to as a mountain might also be referred to as a 
ill (bu not th rs  ‘hill’ and ‘mountain’ are as abstract delological/allosemic notions 
istinct, as are ‘cup’ and ‘mug’. It is for this reason that we can say what clearly differenti-
 hill (e  hill’), ust as we can say what 
learly eren iates a up fro  a mug (e.g. ‘a cup is smaller than a mug and has a bottom 
an  rim’)
Con vance of this analysis to scalar impli-
Figure 8 
Quasi-hyponymy 
on 
is analysis implies is that any entity which can be referred to as a mountain could, in ex
a hill (cf. ‘Everest is a mighty hill
which could be
in
a
and their allosemonic realisations than about delolog
ti
h t e reve e),
d
ates a mountain from a .g. ‘a mountain is bigger than a  j
c diff t  c m
which is smaller th its . 
sider now Figure 8, which introduces the rele
cature. 
 
 Hyperonymy-hyponymy, and Semantic overlap Semantic disjuncti
Ø ¥It’s big, very big 
*It’s big, huge 
*It’s warm, hot 
 *It’s big, useful *?It’s big, small 
‘and’ *It’s big and very big 
*It’s big and huge 
*It’s warm and hot 
¥It’s big and useful *?It’s big and small 
‘and not’ ?It’s big and not very big  ¥?It’s big and not usef
?It’s big and not huge 
?It’s warm and not hot
ul *It’s big and not small 
‘but’ ?It’s big but very big
*It’s big but huge 
¥It’s big but useful *It’s big but small 
*It’s warm but hot 
‘not’ *?It’s big, not very big ?It’s big not us
*?It’s big, not huge 
¥It’s warm, not hot 
eful ¥It’s big not small 
                                                 
8  ( As with phonemes h ica es more generally; cf. the 
c
and p onolog l entiti discussion of the realisations of /bacad/ 
isations of del-
able, but inevi-
f realisations of /hill/ and 
untain/ on ultimately arbitrary (though reasonable) grounds, the point at which we determine putative 
realisations of /hill/, for example, to be no longer valid, but misapplications of the notion ‘hill’ is also ulti-
mately arbitrary. 
vs. /ba at/ in Section 5.2.1.1), we do not really know what the extensional bounds are of real
ological entities, and by extension allosemes. All we can ultimately do is impose some reason
tably arbitrary, limits. Since we can only determine the extensional bounds o
/mo
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‘not’– with rev-
ersal of terms 
*?It’s very big not big 
*?It’s huge not big 
*?It’s hot, not warm 
?It’s useful not big 
 
¥It’s small not big 
‘but not’ ¥It’s big but not very big 
¥It’s big but not huge 
¥It’s warm but not hot 
¥It’s big but not useful *It’s big but not small 
‘in fact’ ¥ It’s big, in fact very big *It’s big , in fact useful      *It’s big in fact small 
¥It’s big, in fact huge
¥It’s warm, in fact hot 
‘not in fact’ *It’s big, not in fact very big 
*It’s big, not in fact huge  
*It’s warm, not in fact hot 
*It’s big, not in fact useful ¥It’s big, not in fact small
not just’ ¥It’s very big, not just big 
¥It’s huge, not just big 
¥It’s not just big, it’s huge 
¥It’s hot, not just warm 
¥It’s
¥It’s useful, not just big 
useful 
*It’s small, not just big 
small 
¥It’s not just big, it’s very big ¥It’s not just big, it’s *It’s not just big, it’s 
 not just warm, it’s hot 
 
However, there is also o r difference, in the top row. ‘It’s big, very big’ is 
e – just as are e’ examples involving hyperonymy en in 
Figure 8: ‘it’s a lorry, a juggernaut’ and ‘it’s a jet, a jumbo (jet)’. Examples such as ‘it’s 
big, huge’, and ‘i  seem very odd – suggesting that the relationship between 
and ‘huge’ t’ is not one of hyperonymy-hy at 
between ‘big’ and
There is also f  evidence that the relationship between ‘big’ and ‘huge’ 
 same as  ‘very b
 
(9) It’s not (just) very big, it’s huge. 
It’s not (just) very,
It’s not (just) very, very, 
 
No matter how extrem ject is described as being – by the addition of more and 
verys, its description as ‘huge’ seems to d g big s in 
an abstract sense bigger than any degree of ‘big’ – i.e. ‘huge’ is abstractly (in terms of del-
ological form, and by extension, allosemes) discrete from ‘big’, albeit that we could, I sus-
pect, fairly reasonably refer to any ‘huge’ entity as ‘big’. If this analysis is right, the rela-
tionship between ‘big’ and ‘huge’ is the same as that between ‘hill’ and ‘mountain’ – ab-
ce also allosemic) discreteness vs. realisational (allodelic, hence 
ne striking majo
fin other ‘substitutiv -hyponymy, giv
t’s warm, hot’
‘big’ or ‘warm’ and ‘ho ponymy (unlike th
 ‘very big’).  
urther compelling
is not the  that between ‘big’ and ig’. Consider the following: 
(10) 
(11) 
 very big, it’s huge. 
very, very, very big, it’s huge. 
ely big an ob
more escribe somethin ger: i.e. ‘huge’ i
stract (delological, hen
also allosemonic) proper inclusion, as in Figure 9. 
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Figure
 
     /
(cf. allosemics) 
  
            
Allodelics    R    
   o      
allosemonics)  huge] of  /huge/ 
  
 
By contrast, ‘very ractly prop cluded within ‘b ings: All ‘very 
big’ things are by definition – i.e. delologically, and hence allosemically – also ‘big’ things 
(but not vice vers i.e. allodelically, and hence allosemonically – it also 
seems a reasonab is properly included within ‘big’: anything which 
an be reasonably described as ‘very big’ can also be reasonably described as ‘big’, but not 
to give the series ‘hot’/‘warm’/‘cool’/‘cold’.  
           
  
f. allosemics)   
of  /very big/ 
         
   
       
 9 
 
 
Delology      /big/  huge/ 
 
    
ealisations   
(cf.  f /big/         [big]  Realisations 
       [
          
       
 big’ things are abst erly in ig’ th
a). Realisationally – 
le claim that ‘very big’ 
c
vice versa. The relationship between ‘big’ and ‘very big’ can thus be diagrammed as in 
Figure 10 (next page). 
The basic analysis in Figure 9 applies not only to the pair ‘big’/‘huge’ but also the pair 
‘warm’/‘hot’. Just as ‘big’/‘huge’ (or ‘huge’/‘big’) can be expanded by adding negative-
type counterparts to give the series ‘huge’/‘big’/‘small’/‘tiny’, so ‘warm’/‘hot’ (= 
‘hot’/‘warm’) can be expanded 
 
Figure 10 
 
 
              
Delology           /big/  
(c     
          /very big/  
           
           
 
                
Allodelics    Realisations          [big]   
(cf.     of /big/              Realisations 
allosemonics)       [very big] 
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There are two striking differences bet  two series, however. Firstly, while the 
on-extreme terms ‘big’ and ‘small’ are the more basic terms in the series 
uge’/‘big’/‘small’/‘tiny’, the extreme terms ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ are the more basic terms in 
e series ‘hot’/‘warm’/‘cool’/‘cold’. An obvious partial reason why ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ are 
at ent cts, etc. – are only ‘warm’ or ‘cool’ 
l tolerances (having to do with partly with the ability of human beings to 
thout causing themselves discomfort or injury). Entities can, however, be 
ot to an unlimited degree, and cold to an apparently unlimited degree (in fact limited by 
t zero).
ries ‘huge’/‘big’/‘small’/‘tiny’ 
‘ho /‘war cold re s ignificant conceptual gap 
 or ‘hot’ and ‘cool’ tha s between ‘big’ and ‘huge’, 
) terms, ‘warm’ 
e’ and 
ig’ (also ‘small’ and ‘tiny’). Realisationally (allodelically, and hence allosemonically), 
 this line of argument is correct, the relationship between ‘hot’ and 
‘w
 
5.3 Scalar implicature and para-referen
have so far considered cases of scalar implicature which involve hyperonymy-hyponymy 
b ’ and very b g’) an  cases hich  have argued involve only quasi-hyponymy, 
o disc logical, hence also allosemic) entities but 
delic hence lso all monic) proper inclusion (e.g. ‘big’ and ‘huge’). 
scalar implicature which might be 
t on ab-
 ( ological, hence also allosemic) proper inclusion or even realisational (allodelic, 
ence also allosemonic) proper inclusion, but a form of proper inclusion which emerges by 
n o  what will c re para-ref rence, rather than reference proper. 
: 
(12) I’m going to buy bread. 
ween these
n
‘h
th
more basic than ‘warm’ and ‘cool’ is th ities – obje
within very smal
handle them wi
h
absolu e  
A second, and perhaps related, difference between the se
and t’ m’/‘cool’/‘ ’ is that the eems to be a more s
between ‘warm’ and ‘cold’, n there doe
or perhaps ‘small’ and ‘tiny’. In abstract (delological, and hence allosemic
and ‘hot’ (also ‘cool’ and ‘cold’) seem to be discrete in the same way as are ‘hug
‘b
however, it seems less plausible to say that ‘hot’ is properly included within ‘warm’ (also 
that ‘cold’ is properly included within ‘cool’) in the same way that ‘huge’ is properly in-
cluded within ‘big’ (cf. Figure 10). Not all hot things (in the real world) could reasonably 
be described as ‘warm’ (just as not all cold things in the real world could also reasonably 
be described as ‘cool’). Some things are unambiguously hot and not even plausibly de-
scribable as warm (just as some things are unambiguously cold, and not even plausibly 
describable as cool). If
arm’ (also ‘cold’ and ‘cool’) is one of abstract (delological, hence also allosemic) dis-
creteness, and realisational (allodelic, hence also allosemonic) overlap (rather than realisa-
tional proper inclusion, as in the case of ‘big’ and ‘huge’: Figure 9). 
 
tiality 
 
I 
(e.g. ‘ ig  ‘ i d  w  I
i.e. where there are tw rete abstract (delo
realisational (allo ,  a ose
In the following sections, I will consider a third kind of 
said to involve pseudo-hyperonymy. Scalar implicature of this third kind relies no
stract del
h
consideratio f I all he e
  
  
5.3.1 Reference and para-reference 
 
Consider the following
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In 
ible ‘bread’ – is likely to be interpreted as meaning ‘bread and nothing 
els
.3.1.1 Referential excluders (exclusives) 
he analysis of examples such as 13 and 14 as involving what I have termed para-
ences of 
cheese’ would be ‘cheese and everything else’. The set ‘bread and every-
e same extensionally as the set ‘cheese and everything else’ – they have the 
everything else). It would thus, under this rather crude 
terpretation, be impossible to distinguish the delological form (viewed in extensional 
e delological form of ‘cheese’ – or of anything in fact.  
A more sophisticated version of this approach might deal with some of these problems – 
t complication in the analysis. Even with a sophisticated ver-
referring to ‘bread’ here, the speaker has not said anything about whether they are going 
to buy bread only or bread and other things. The reference is simply to ‘bread’. 
Consider, now, however, the following: 
 
(13) A. What did you buy at the Co-op? 
 B. [I bought] bread. 
 
Here, speaker B’s statement – whether in its full form ‘I bought bread’ or the conversation-
ally more plaus
e’. However, in saying ‘bread’, the speaker has simply referred to ‘bread’. The addi-
tional information ‘and nothing else [of relevance in the context]’ we can refer to as a 
‘para-reference’; it is not part of the reference of ‘bread’ but it can be regarded as an ele-
ment of what is being referred to overall. This kind of para-reference which excludes other 
things we can refer to as an exclusive para-reference. 
We can, for current purposes contrast exclusive para-reference with non-exclusive para-
reference. Consider the following: 
 
(14) When you go to the shops buy [some] bread. 
 
The reference of ‘bread’ here is, as in the previous examples, to bread. However, the 
speaker in 14 is unlikely to be interpreted as in 13 to mean ‘bread only’. Rather in this con-
text, what is meant is ‘bread – together (possibly) with other things’. This reference, which 
is additional to the basic reference ‘bread’, can be referred to as a non-exclusive para-
reference. 
 
 
5
 
T
reference needs some justification. The most straightforward means of justification is to 
consider – and reject – the obvious alternatives. The first alternative is that there is no need 
to distinguish between reference and para-reference (with its exclusive, non-exclusive, and 
no doubt other sub-types): everything can be included within reference (proper).  
This view leads to rapid and extreme complications. In the case of ‘When you go to the 
shops buy [some] bread’ we would have to say that the reference of ‘bread’ is something 
like ‘bread and other things’ or ‘bread – not excluding other things’, or similar. Given a 
rather crude version of this approach, we would have to say that the range of references of 
‘non-exclusive bread’ is ‘bread and everything else’. Similarly, the range of refer
‘non-exclusive 
thing else’ is th
same members (bread, cheese, and 
in
terms) of ‘bread’ from th
but at the cost, I believe, of grea
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sion, however, such an approach would apparently yield two senses (allosemes) for words 
where there is, according to all other standard criteria, only one. Thus, we would, apparently, 
om a dough of flour or meal, mixed with water or 
ilk’: Collins English Dictionary) is one alloseme when it has the meaning (or ‘interpreta-
another alloseme when it has the meaning (‘inter-
uding other things’ (‘non-exclusive bread’). The attempt to in-
lude ‘para-reference’ within reference (‘reference proper’) thus appears to break down. 
8: 248–279; Horn 2009): 
 
y bread only. 
6) When you go to the Co-Op buy bread. 
 we reject the notion of para-reference altogether, we would have to say that 15 and 16 
this, if we were to say that they have the same (equivalent) reference, we would 
ave to say that ‘only’ does not have a reference, and therefore, by extension, that ‘only’ 
oes not have a delological form. Yet, it seems intuitively obvious that ‘only’ (in the rele-
ning (yielding a difference in standard meaning 
etween ‘When you go to the Co-Op buy bread’ and ‘When you go to the Co-Op buy 
otions –
 de
have to say that ‘bread’ (= ‘food made fr
m
tion) ‘bread only’ (‘exclusive bread’) and 
pretation’) ‘bread, not excl
c
The second alternative to the reference plus para-reference analysis would be to accept 
the notion of reference, but to reject the notion of para-reference altogether – perhaps re-
garding ‘para-reference’ as merely a matter of pragmatic inference (just as one can infer 
from a statement ‘It’s hot in here’ uttered in the right circumstances that the speaker wants 
the hearer to open a window in the room where they are both sitting). There are, however, 
fairly compelling reasons not to do this. Consider the following (for recent pragmatic anal-
yses of ‘only’, see Abbott 2006; Beaver and Clark 200
(15) When you go to the Co-Op bu
(1
 
If
uttered in the same (equivalent) circumstances mean the same thing: they have the same 
reference. However, not only do 15 and 16 mean different things, in an obvious pre-
theoretical sense (16 meaning, normally, that the addressee should buy bread amongst oth-
er things, and 15 meaning, absolutely, that the addressee should buy nothing except bread). 
More than 
h
d
vant sense, i.e. alloseme) does have a mea
b
bread only’), and that this meaning should be accounted for by an analysis in terms of de-
notation (and reference). The attempt to reject ‘para-reference’ altogether thus also seems 
to break down.  
The above sketch of ‘reference’ vs. ‘para-reference’ is only exploratory. I have not, for 
example, considered how para-reference relates to more abstract semantic n
lological form (and by extension alloseme). For a proper account these aspects would 
need to be coherently developed and justified. For present purposes, however, the notion of 
para-reference is sufficient. 
 
 
5.3.2 Para-reference and scalar implicature 
 
Having considered and attempted to justify the distinction between reference and para-
reference, I turn now to the application of the notion of para-reference – involving pseudo-
hyponymy – to scalar implicature, looking in particular at ‘some’ vs. ‘all’ and cardinal 
numbers (for recent pragmatic accounts of these, see Carston 1998, and Breheny 2008). 
Consider Figure 11: 
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Figure 11 
 
Hyperonymy-hyponymy, Quasi-
hyponymy, and Pseudo-hyponymy 
Semantic overlap Semantic disjunction 
Ø ¥It’s a car, a hatchback 
*?It’s big, huge 
*I know some of them, all of them 
   *It’s big, useful *?It’s big, small 
*I know 3 of them, 4 of them 
‘and’ *It’s a car and a hatchback 
*It’s big and huge 
*I know some of them and all of them 
* I know 3 of them and 4 of them 
¥It’s big and useful *?It’s big and small 
‘and not’ ?It’s a car and not a hatchback 
?It’s big and not huge 
 ¥?It’s big and not useful *It’s big and not small 
?I know some of them and not all of 
them 
?I know 3 of them and not 4 of them
‘but’ ¥?It’s a car, but a hatchback 
*It’s big but huge 
*I know some of them but all of them 
*I know 3 of them but 4 of them 
¥It’s big but useful *It’s big but small 
‘not’ *It’s a car, not a hatchback 
?It’s big, not huge 
¥?I know some of them not all of them 
¥?I know 3 of them not 4 of them 
?It’s big not useful ¥It’s big not small 
‘not’– with re-
versal of terms 
*?It’s a hatchback, not a car 
*?It’s very big not big 
¥?I know all of them not some of them 
¥I know 4 of them not 3 of them 
?It’s useful not big 
 
¥It’s small not big 
‘but not’ ¥It’s a car but not a hatchback ¥It’s big but not useful *It’s big but not small 
¥It’s big but not very big 
¥I know some of them, but not all of 
them 
¥?I know 3 of them but not 4 of them 
‘in fact’ ¥It’s a car, in fact a hatchback 
¥It’s big, in fact very big 
f 
*It’s big, in fact useful      *It’s big in fact small 
¥I know some of them, in fact all o
them 
¥? I know 3 of them, in fact 4 of them 
‘not in fact’ *It’s a car, not in fact a hatchback 
*It’s big, not in fact very big 
*I know some of them, not in fact all of 
them 
*It’s big, not in fact use-
ful 
¥It’s big, not in fact sm
*I know 3 of them, not in fact 4 of them 
all
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not just’ ¥?It’s a hatchback, not just a 
¥?
¥
¥It
st some of 
 
’s useful, not just big 
¥It’s not just big, it’s 
use
*It’s small, not just big 
*It’s not just big, it’s 
sm
car ¥It
It’s not just a car, it’s a hatchback 
It’s very big, not just big 
’s not just big, it’s very big 
¥I know all of them not ju
them 
¥I know 4 of them not just 3 of them
ful all 
 
gure 11 s ponymy (Sections 5.2–5.2.1.1) 
hyperonymy-hy lar implicature involving para-reference – what I shall call 
‘pseudo-hypon h not identically to) hyponymy and quasi-
hyponymy. 
consid hen go o
numbers fit fair nymy-hyponymy in Figure 11 (and given that this is the 
simplest situati e first question to ask is why cardinal num-
bers cannot sim e analysed in terms of hyperonymy-hyponymy. According to such an 
analysis, ‘two’ d be properly included within ‘three’, ‘four’ 
umbers above four) would be properly inclu ’, etc
This analysis is intuitively rather bizarre, suggesting that ‘four’ is a type of ‘three’ (just 
as a hatchback tuitively impossible to fit with the fact that 
in mathematics ‘four’ is not a type of ‘three’, or ‘three’ a type of ‘two’. In mathematics, 
5. If ‘four’ was a type of ‘three’, and ‘three’ a type of ‘two’, there would be no obvi-
‘two’ as a type r (given that ‘three’, for example, would 
also be a type o tc.). This already seems too problematic to 
incorporate within a hyp  model. 
e, s ‘in fact’ can co-occur not only with larger num-
 Carsten 1998) Thus: 
 
(17) Twelve m bble – in fact six. 
Or, rather bette me basic point: 
 
(18) A dozen men will be able to shift that rubble – in fact half a dozen. 
 
ere to nymy a  
have to conclud rly included not only within ‘four’ and all other larger 
numbers, but al aller numbers (including minus numbers?). 
Similarly ‘four’ would be properly included within ‘five’ and all other larger numbers, but 
also within ‘thr . By logical extension all cardinal numbers 
ope ardin  
and thus destroying (by reductio ad absurdum) the analysis of proper inclusion (hypero-
nymy-hyponym
The second alternative analysis of cardinal numbers to consider is that of quasi-
hyponymy, i.e. tionally properly included within ‘four’, 
As Fi hows, just as quasi-hy patterns rather like 
ponymy, so sca
ymy’ – patterns rather like (thoug
I will er cardinal numbers first, t n to ‘some’ and ‘all’. Given that cardinal 
ly well with hypero
on represented in that figure), th
ply b
(and numbers above two) woul
(and n ded within ‘three . 
is a type of car). It also seems in
3+2=
ous reason why 3+2 could not equal seven (interpreting ‘three’ as a type of ‘four’ and 
 of ‘three’) – or any other numbe
c. ef ‘five’, or ‘six’ or ‘seven’, et
eronymy-hyponymy
Even wors
bers, but also w
 however, a form such a
ith smaller ones (cf. . 
en will be able to shift that ru
 
r, but illustrating the sa
If we w adopt a hyperonymy-hypo nalysis for cardinal numbers, we would
e that ‘three’ is prope
so within ‘two’ and all other sm
ee’ and all other smaller numbers
would be pr rly included within all other c al numbers – making them all synonyms, 
y) altogether.  
 that ‘three’ for example is realisa
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but that ‘three’ delolo s
also collapses r’ -nu
number ‘extens  no differe  the realisations of ‘three’, or of 
any other numb herefore, like that of bacad ‘after, following’ and 
ba
c
at ‘he sent’ re no realisations of bacat which are unam-
biguously distinct from those of ba ad, although there are realisations of bacad, i.e. as [ba-
cad], which are hose of bacat. In the case of cardinal num-
ers, there would be no realisational distinctness whatsoever – dictating that all cardinal 
In fact, this is a common-sense analysis. Consider the following: 
 
n just ‘John and 
Ma
 further complication to the analysis 
rat
reference what seems to be their 
ference: ‘two’ refers to two, ‘three’ to three, ‘four’ to four, etc. In addition, however, 
st other types, probably). In 
ost contexts, cardinal numbers have an exclusive para-reference, and always in a mathe-
clusive para-reference: 
B. It’s okay. I’ve got two pounds on me. 
ing the fact that one can say not only ‘I went to the cinema 
wi
 and ‘four’ are abstractly ( gically) discrete. Thi  proposed analysis 
because the realisations of ‘fou (taking both larger
nt from
mber and smaller-
ions’ into account) are
er. This situation is not, t
(Section 5.2.1.1), where there a
c
 unambiguously distinct from t
b
numbers were synonyms of one another. 
In terms of the options established in this paper, this leaves only the choice that scalar 
implicature in relation to cardinal numbers is a function of para-reference (pseudo-
hyponymy). 
(19) I went to the cinema with John and Mary – not John, Mary and Paul. 
(20) I went to the cinema with two of them – not three of them. 
 
In the case of 19, ‘John and Mary’ has an exclusive para-reference – i.e. ‘John and Mary 
only’, and one might say in this context ‘John and Mary only’ rather tha
ry’. Similarly, in the case of 20, ‘two of them’ has an exclusive para-reference, and one 
might say here ‘two of them only’ rather than just ‘two of them’. Cardinal numbers thus 
function in the same kind of way as does the mentioning of individuals (or other entities), 
allowing for either the possibility of additional entities (non-exclusive para-reference) or, 
as here, for their exclusion (exclusive para-reference). In the case of cardinal numbers, 
there is a further ‘dimension’ of para-referentiality which is opened up. Thus, I can say ‘I 
went to the cinema with two of them’, while not excluding other groups of people with 
whom I also went to the cinema. This, however, is a
her than a refutation of it. 
To recap and amplify, cardinal numbers have as their 
re
they have para-references: exclusive or non-exclusive (among
m
matical context. However, they may also have a non-ex
 
(21) A. I need a couple of quid. 
 
 
Here, speaker B is not saying that they have only two pounds on them. They are not using 
‘two’ with an exclusive, but rather with a non-exclusive para-reference. 
The same principles which apply to cardinal numbers also apply to ‘some’ and ‘all’. I will 
not go through the full workings to show that the relationship between ‘some’ and ‘all’ in-
volves para-reference (pseudo-hyponymy), rather than quasi-hyponymy, or hyperonymy-
hyponymy. The parallelism between cardinal numbers and ‘some’ and ‘all’ seems suffi-
ciently established by consider
th John and Mary – not John, Mary and Paul’ and ‘I went to the cinema with two of them 
– not three of them’, but also ‘I went to the cinema with some of them – not all of them’. 
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Referential excluders (cf. Section 5.3.1.) are, of course, common with cardinal numbers, 
and may occur with ‘some’: thus, ‘I know three of them, in fact four’ (but not *‘I know only 
three of them, in fact four’), ‘I know some – in fact all – of them’ (but not *‘I know only 
some – in fact all – of them’). With cardinal numbers, ‘exactly’ is also used as a referential 
excluder (e.g. thus we cannot coherently say *‘I know exactly three of them, in fact four’). 
Also common with cardinal numbers are referential non-excluders (i.e. the opposite of 
referential excluders), that is words and phrases whose meaning is not compatible with an 
exclusive para-reference, such as ‘at least’ and ‘at most’ (e.g. ‘I know at least three of 
them, in fact four’). 
 
rabic 
 
asis. It is, however, worth 
ntertaining the possibility that even this type of associative meaning may not be entirely 
 
6. Contextually determined associative meaning: an example from A
 
There is obviously a strong tradition from Grice onwards, that what is termed in this paper
scalar implicature-based associative meaning has a pragmatic b
e
pragmatic, and may involve conventional elements which can vary in different languages. 
Certainly, there are ways in which associative-type meaning can differ between lan-
guages which go beyond the fairly simple linguistic-semantic conventions illustrated by 
19th century written Dutch vernietigen vs. vernielen. A good example is provided by Ara-
bic. Consider example 22, from the short story curs az-zain (‘The Wedding of Zein’; re-
produced in Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2002: 95), where the Arabic original is followed 
by a relatively literal English translation and then a relatively idiomatic English translation. 
 
(22) Arabic original 
yataۊawwal al-mƗ’ ‘ilƗ mir’Ɨ ڲaxma muڲƯ’a tataۊarrak fawq ܈afۊati-hƗ ڴփ ilƗl al-naxl 
wa-aƥ܈Ɨn al-šajar. 
 
Relatively literal English translation 
[…] the water is transformed into a giant shining mirror on whose surface move the 
shadows of the palms and the branches of the trees. 
 
Relatively idiomatic English translation 
d into a giant shining mirror on whose surface move the […] the water is transforme
shadows of the palms and the branches of the other trees. 
lude that of naxl 
‘pa
 
Here šajar ‘trees’, is a hyperonym/superordinate of naxl ‘palms/palm-trees’ In this context 
in Arabic, however, the meaning of šajar has to be taken to exc
lms/palm-trees’, i.e. in this particular context šajar (in the relevant alloseme) has to be 
interpreted as having the particular allosemon [trees excluding palm-trees] (i.e. the ascrip-
tion R{tree excluding palm-tree}) – as reflected in the idiomatic English translation ‘other 
trees’). 
Example 23 (from a short story by Anis Mansour entitled ۊafnat turƗb ‘A Handful of 
Dust’, discussed in Dickins and Watson 1999: 550) illustrates the same general point.  
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(23) Arabic original 
wa-hum lƗ yataۊaddaܔǌn ‘ilƗ ‘aۊad min an-nƗs … wa-lƗkinna-hum yudƗcibǌn al-
bƗca wa-l-mutajawwilƯn 
 
Relatively literal English translation 
They don’t talk to anyone, but they joke with the sellers and the barrow-men. 
 
Idiomatic translation: 
They don’t talk to anyone, but they joke with the shopkeepers and the barrow-men. 
ere, bƗca ‘sellers’, is a hyperonym/superordinate of mutajawwilƯn ‘barrow-men’ (literally 
rrow 
ean-
c
 
 this dered three types of associative meaning – extralinguistic-based, 
ingui d. I have also briefly considered a fourth type 
of ‘s
pairs.
ia an ded axiomatic functionalism. I 
ave (unascribed semantic-image correlate plus 
ascrip
(thou
nded
eaning – and the more coherent our model of utterance-meaning, the 
 
H
‘travelling [people]’), but in this alloseme meaning people who sell goods from a ba
r handcart); all barrow-men are sellers but not all sellers are barrow-men. Here, the mo
ing of bƗ a has to be taken to exclude that of mutajawwilƯn ‘barrow-men’, i.e. in this par-
ticular context bƗca (in the relevant alloseme) has to be interpreted as having the particular 
allosemon [sellers excluding barrow-men] (i.e. the ascription R{seller excluding barrow-
man}) – as reflected in the English idiomatic English translation ‘shopkeepers’). 
Cases in which a hyperonym/superordinate is coordinated with a hyponym are relatively 
frequent in Arabic (cf. Dickins and Watson 1999: 550–555 for other examples). In all cas-
es, the hyperonym/superordinate (necessarily in the relevant alloseme) is interpreted as 
having a communicative contextually determined allosemon whose ascription can be char-
acterised as R{‘HYPERONYM EXCLUDING HYPONYM’}. This interpretation derives 
from a convention of Arabic which does not obtain in English. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 paper I have consiIn
l stic-based, and scalar implicature-base
ub-denotative’ meaning from Arabic involving coordinated hyperonym-hyponym 
 I have progressively developed a model for what is meant by associative meaning, 
 exposition of relevant aspects of the theory of extenv
h also developed a referent-plus-ascription 
tion) model of ‘utterance-meaning’ on the basis of ideas put forward in Dickins 1998 
gh with a better integration of these ideas into the overall theoretical model of ex-
 axiomatic functionalism than in Dickins 1998). I have tried to show that because of te
its precise and integrated approach, the current model is able, via notions such as auto-
hyposemony (Section 5.2), to provide accounts of utterance-meaning which are specific, 
adequate to the facts, and coherent.  
The current paper has not attempted to provide a new account – or even to consider in 
any detail – existing accounts of how we understand the meaning of scalar implicatures, or 
other aspects of utterance-meaning. However, it has attempted to produce what I believe is 
a sine qua non for such an undertaking – an account of what the utterance-meanings of the 
relevant phenomena are. In order to understand how a hearer understands what an utterance 
eans, we need to know first what it means: that is to say, we have to have a coherent m
model of utterance-m
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more we are likely to be able to provide an adequate account of how speakers/hearers un-
dersta
A coherent model of utterance meaning implies also (i) a coherent model of the more 
bstract elements on which utterance-meaning relies, and (ii) an account of what utterances 
of the nce actual meaning can only be properly 
under is type 
ight mean. This is particularly clear in respect of areas of utterance meaning such as sca-
lar im ding of the meaning of ‘some’, for example, on a particular 
ccur h 
relationship between ‘cup’ 
nd ‘mug’ in English is the same as that between ‘surgeon’ and ‘goalkeeper’ – a view re-
hat we can meaningfully say ‘he is both a surgeon and a goalkeeper’, but 
p and a mug’.  
nd what utterances mean. 
a
 type being investigated might mean – si
stood against the backdrop of the range of things which an utterance of th
m
plicature: the understan
o
‘s
rence of use can be regarded as ‘selected’ from the range of possible meanings whic
ome’ might have across all similar, and different, types of possible occurrence. At its 
most basic, this implies a model which accounts for the full extensional range of utterances 
of the type being investigated.  
To illustrate the principles laid out in the previous paragraph in practice, we may con-
sider first cases of abstract disjunction plus realisational overlap (e.g. ‘cup’ vs. ‘mug’; Sec-
tion 5.21), as contrasted with cases of abstract overlap plus realisational overlap (e.g. ‘sur-
geon’ vs. ‘goalkeeper’). If we were simply to consider the set of entities in all possible 
worlds which can be referred to as ‘cups’, as compared to those which can be referred to as 
‘mugs’, we would conclude correctly that there are some entities which can be referred to 
equally as ‘cups’ or as ‘mugs’. If we were similarly simply to consider the sets of entities 
in all possible worlds which can be referred to as ‘surgeons’, as compared to ‘goalkeepers’ 
we would also correctly conclude that there are some entities which can be referred to 
equally as ‘surgeons’ or ‘goalkeepers’. A simple possible world-based comparison of this 
type would lead us to conclude, incorrectly, that the semantic 
a
futed by the fact t
not ‘it is both a cu
Conversely, if we were to adopt a purely abstract-based approach to utterance meaning, 
we would conclude that ‘cup’ and ‘mug’ are purely disjunct concepts, while ‘surgeon’ and 
‘goalkeeper’ are overlapping concepts – a view refuted by the fact that there are entities in 
the world which can be referred to either as ‘cup’ or as ‘mug’. What is needed is a combi-
nation of the abstract (delological, and by extension allosemic) and the concrete (or realisa-
tional, i.e. allodelic and deletic, and by extension allosemonic and semonetic). This allows 
us to understand semantic elements as being abstractly (delologically, and by extension 
allosemically) disjunct but concretely (realisationally, i.e. allodelically and deletically, and 
by extension allosemonically and semonetically) overlapping (as in the case of ‘mug’ and 
‘cup’) as opposed to semantic elements, for example, such as ‘surgeon’ and ‘goalkeeper’, 
which are both abstractly (delologically, and by extension allosemically) and concretely 
(realisationally, allodelically and deletically, and by extension allosemonically and se-
monetically) overlapping. The double abstract-concrete/realisational model makes plain 
why pairs such as ‘cup/mug’ and ‘surgeon/goalkeeper’ behave similarly in language use in 
some respects but differently in others.  
The same general principles apply to the different hyponymy-type relationships consid-
ered in this paper: hyperonymy-hyponymy (hyponymy proper), quasi-hyponymy, and 
pseudo-hyponymy (para-referentiality). The different possibilities for meaningful utter-
ances which these display reflect both the abstract (delological, and by extension al-
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losemic) and concrete (realisational – allodelic and deletic, and by extension allosemonic 
and semonetic) levels. 
In the case of hyperonymy-hyponymy, or hyponymy proper (as in ‘lorry’-‘juggernaut’; 
Section 5.1), we cannot, for example, meaningfully (truthfully) say (a) “a juggernaut is 
larger than a lorry”, but we can meaningfully say “a juggernaut is a very large lorry”. This 
reflects the analysis that ‘juggernaut’ is properly included within ‘lorry’ at both the abstract 
and concrete levels.  
By contrast, in the case of quasi-hyponymy (as in ‘hill’-‘mountain’), we can meaning-
fully say both (a) “a mountain is larger than a hill” (what I have suggested is an abstract-
oriented utterance; Section 5.2.1.1), and (b) “a mountain is a very large hill” (a con-
crete/realisational-oriented utterance; Section 5.2.1.1). This reflects the analysis that 
‘mountain’ is abstractly disjunct from ‘hill’, but concretely/realisationally properly in-
cluded within it.  
In the case of pseudo-hyponymy, involving para-reference (as in the case of ‘three’-
‘four’; Section 5.3.2) we can meaningfully say (a) “four books is/are more than three 
books” (cf. Section 5.2.1.1), but we cannot meaningfully say (b) “four books is an extreme 
case of three books” (cf. Section 5.2.1.1 – one cannot, of course, meaningfully talk about 
“a very large three books”; I have therefore substituted the roughly corresponding “An 
extreme case of three books”). This patterning reflects the fact that ‘four’ is both abstractly 
and concretely/realisationally disjunct from ‘three’. 
The utterances discussed in the previous paragraph can be tabulated as in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12 
 (a)-type: abstract-oriented 
utterance COMPARA-
(b)-type: con-
crete/realisational-
TIVE+than oriented utterance 
Hyperonymy-hyponymy: 
abstract and concrete 
/realisational proper inclusion 
*a juggernaut is larger than a 
lorry 
a juggernaut is a very large lorry 
Quasi-hyponymy:  
abstract disjunction and concrete 
/realisational proper inclusion 
a mountain is larger than a hill a mountain is a very large hill 
Pseudo-hyponymy: 
abstract and concrete 
/realisational disjunction 
four books is more than three 
books 
*four books is an extreme case of 
three books 
 
As can be seen from Figure 12, different configurations of proper inclusion and disjunction 
at the abstract and concrete/realisational levels are reflected in different utterance possibili-
ties. In the case of hyperonymy-hyponymy (abstract and concrete/realisational proper in-
clusion) the (a)-type comparative structure is not meaningful (true), but the (b)-type ‘very 
large’ structure is. In the case of quasi-hyponymy (abstract disjunction with con-
crete/realisational proper inclusion) both the (a)-type comparative and the (b)-type ‘very 
large’ structures are meaningful. In the case of pseudo-hyponymy (abstract and concrete 
disjunction), the (a)-type comparative structure is meaningful, but the (b)-type ‘extreme 
case of’ (equivalent to ‘very large’) structure is not. 
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